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WHAT THE WALL SEPARATES: A
DEBATE ON THOMAS JEFFERSON'S
"WALL OF SEPARATION" METAPHOR
[A]greement, in the abstract, that the First Amendment was
designed to erect a "wall of separation between church and
State," does not preclude a clash of views as to what the wall
separates.
Justice Felix Frankfurter*

DanielL. Dreisbach**
John D. Whaley***
No word or phrase is associated more closely by Americans
with the topic of church-state relations than the "wall of separation between church and state." Although it is unclear why this
metaphor has become so ingrained in the public mind, there is
no doubt that Americans associate the image with one person:
Thomas Jefferson. In an 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist Association of Connecticut, President Jefferson used the celebrated
"wall of separation" metaphor to define the First Amendment
religious clauses. Jefferson wrote:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between Man & his God, that he owes account to none other
for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, & not opinions, I contemplate
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their legislature should "make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the

* McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 213 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
** Associate Professor of Justice, Law and Society, American University, School
of Public Affairs.
*** Ph.D. candidate, American University, School of Public Affairs.
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free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation be1
tween Church & State.

In the twentieth century, Jefferson's "wall" has profoundly
influenced discourse and policy on church-state relations. It is
accepted by many Americans as a pithy description of the constitutionally prescribed church-state arrangement. More important, the judiciary has embraced the metaphor, adopting it not
only as an organizing theme of church-state analysis, but also as
a virtual rule of constitutional law. The use of Jefferson's metaphor to define the First Amendment has not been without controversy.2 The fact remains, however, that both the courts and
the public at large have embraced the "wall" metaphor as the
primary emblem of American church-state relations. Given the
metaphor's influence, it is important to understand what Jefferson meant by it. To that end, this article presents two contrasting interpretations of Jefferson's "wall." John D. Whaley offers
a broad separationist interpretation, in accord with recent judicial applications of the metaphor. 3 Daniel L. Dreisbach, to the
contrary, argues that the principal function of the "wall" erected
in the Danbury letter was to separate state and nation in matters
pertaining to religion rather than to separate ecclesiastical
authorities from all civil government.
Before presenting these arguments, we describe the circumstances that prompted Jefferson's correspondence with the Baptists, as well as the general historical context in which the
Danbury letter was written. We then proceed to the argumentative sections. Whaley offers a separationist interpretation of Jefferson's "wall," followed by Dreisbach's argument for a jurisdictional interpretation. We conclude by offering some final
observations on the use of metaphors in American law. In particular, we consider the promises and limitations of Jefferson's
"wall" for informing discourse and shaping policy on church and
state in the United States.
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins,
and Stephen S. Nelson, a committee of the Danbury Baptist association in the state of
Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Series 1, Box 89, Dec. 2, 1801-Jan. 1, 1802. Also available in Daniel
L. Dreisbach, "Sowing Useful Truths and Principles": The Danbury Baptists,
Thomas Jefferson, and the "Wall of Separation," 39J. of Church & State 455,455 (1997).
2. For a synthesis of these criticisms, sec Dreisbach, 39 J. of Church & State at
493-500 (cited in note 1). Portions of this article are reprinted here by permission.
3. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); McCollum v. Board
of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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I. JEFFERSON, THE DANBURY BAPTISTS, AND

AMERICA IN TRANSITION
Jefferson was inaugurated the third president of the United
States on March 4, 1801, following one of the most bitterly contested presidential elections in American history. Religion, in
particular, emerged as a critical issue in the campaign. This was
due in part to Jefferson's unorthodox religious views, but more
generally to the fact that American religious culture was changing dramatically. The Second Great Awakening, in its early
stages at the turn of the century, unleashed a proliferation of diverse denominations and dissenting sects that chafed under the
old establishment order. This revival was only one part of the
dynamic aftermath of the American Revolution, a period that
would see the United States quickly become the most commer4
cial, egalitarian, and evangelical nation in the world. All forms
of authority and hierarchy-social, political, economic and especially religious-were being re-thought. According to historian
Gordon S. Wood, "the American Revolution accelerated the
challenges to religious authority that had begun with the First
Great Awakening. Just as people were taking over their governments, so, it was said, they should take over their churches.
Christianity had to be republicanized. "5 This a version to ecclesiastical authority encouraged the disestablishment of state
churches throughout the former colonies, a trend that had begun
in Jefferson's own Virginia. And, referring to the presidential
election of 1800, John Adams admitted that an antiestablishment sentiment among these popular, voluntaristic sects
"had an immense effect, and turned [voters] in such numbers as
decided the election. "6
It was against this backdrop that on October 7, 1801, a
committee of the Danbury Baptist Association wrote a congratulatory letter to Jefferson on his "appointment to the chief
Magistracy in the United States." 7 Organized in 1790, the
4. Gordon S. Wood. The Radicalism of the American Revolution 332 (Alfred A.
Knopf, 1992).
5. ld. at 332. For further discussion on the popular effects of the Second Great
Awakening, sec Nathan 0. Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity (Yale
U. Press, 1989); Perry Miller, From the Covenant to the Revival, in James Ward Smith
and A. Leland Jamison, eds., The Shaping of American Religion (Princeton U. Press,
1%1).
6. Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (Aug. 8, 1807), in Charles F. Adams,
ed., Correspondence Between John E. Adams and Mercy Warren 435, 436 (Arno Press,
1972).
7. Letter from a committee of the Danbury Baptist association to Thomas Jeffer-
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Danbury Baptist Association was an alliance of "twenty-six
churches, most of them in the Connecticut Valley, stretching
from Suffield to Middletown and including several as far west as
Amenia, New York." By the turn of the century, "[t]hese
twenty-six churches had a total of 1484 members but this number
could be multiplied by five to include all the nominal adherents
8
of these churches. " The Connecticut Baptists, who were a religious minority in a state where Congregationalism was the established church, supported Jefferson politically because of his
unflagging commitment to religious liberty. The Danbury Baptists were also Republican partisans in a stronghold of the Federalist party. In short, they were a beleaguered religious and
political minority subjected to discrimination by law in a state in
which a Congregationalist-Federalist axis firmly controlled political life.
In their address, the Danbury Baptists celebrated Jefferson's election, affirmed their devotion to religious liberty, and
chastised those who had criticized the president "as an enemy of
religion Law & good order." The Baptists wrote:
Our Sentiments are uniformly on the side of Religious Liberty-That Religion is at all times and places a Matter between
God and Individuals- That no man ought to suffer in Name,
person or effects on account of his religious Opinions-That
the legitimate Power of civil Government extends no further
than to punish the man who works ill to his neighbour: But
Sir, our constitution of government is not specific. Our antient charter, together with the Laws made coincident therewith, were adopted as the Basis of our government, At the
time of our revolution; and such had been our Laws & usages,
& such still are; that Religion is consider,d as the first object
of Legislation; & therefore what religious privileges we enjoy
(as a minor part of the State) we enjoy as favors granted, and
not as inalienable rights: and these favors we receive at the
expence of such degrading acknowledgements, as are inconsistent with the rights of fre[ e ]men. It is not to be wondered
at therefore; if those, who seek after power & gain under the
pretence of government & Religion should reproach their fellow men-should reproach their chief Magistrate, as an enemy of religion Law & good order because he will not, dares

son (Oct. 7, 1801), in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress), Series 1, Box 87, Aug. 30, 1801-0ct. 15, 1801. Also available in Dreisbach, 39
1. of Church & State at 460-61 (cited in note 1).
8. William G. McLoughlin, 2 New England Dissent, 1630-1833: The Baptists and
the Separation of Church and State 920,986 (Harvard U. Press, 1971) (footnote omitted).

1999]

JEFFERSON'S WALL OF SEPARATION

631

not assume the prerogative of Jehovah and make Laws to
govern the Kingdom of Christ.
Sir, we are sensible that the President of the united States, is
not the national Legislator, & also sensible that the national
government cannot destroy the Laws of each State; but our
hopes are strong that the sentiments of our beloved President,
which have had such genial Effect already, like the radiant
beams of the Sun, will shine & prevail through all these States
and all the world till Hierarchy and tyranny be destroyed
from the Earth. Sir, when we reflect on your past services,
and see a glow of philanthropy and good will shining forth in
a course of more than thirty years we have reason to believe
that America,s God has raised you up to fill the chair of State
out of that good will which he bears to the Millions which you
preside over. May God strengthen you for the arduous task
which providence & the voice of the people have cal,d you to
sustain and support you in your Administration against all the
predetermined opposition of those who wish to rise to wealth
9
& importance on the poverty and subjection of the people.

The issue of foremost importance to the Baptists was
whether "religious privileges" were rightly regarded as "inalienable rights" or merely as "favors granted" and subject to withdrawal by the civil state. The Baptists believed that religious liberty was an inalienable right, and they were deeply troubled that
the religious privileges of dissenters in Connecticut were treated
as favors that could be granted or denied by the political authorities. They outlined the basic principles undergirding their claim
to religious liberty. They described religion as an essentially private matter between an individual and his God. No citizen, they
reasoned, ought to suffer civil disability on account of his religious opinions. The legitimate powers of civil government reach
actions, but not opinions. These were principles Jefferson embraced, and he reaffirmed them in his reply to the Baptists.
The surviving manuscripts reveal that Jefferson's reply was
written with meticulous care and planned effect. The fact that a
preliminary draft of the letter-with scribbled amendments and
a marginal note explaining one major change-was retained in
Jefferson's papers along with the version of the letter eventually
sent indicates the significance the president attached to this

9. Letter from a committee of the Danbury Baptist association to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 7, 1801), in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (cited in note 7).
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statement. 10 Letters of courtesy, like the one sent by the
Danbury Baptists, were not particularly welcomed by the president but neither were they lightly dismissed with merely a cordial response in kind. Rather, Jefferson thought such correspondence furnished an occasion for "sowing useful truths &
principles among the people, which might germinate and become rooted among their political tenets. " 11 Although the
Danbury Baptists did not request a religious proclamation, Jefferson thought the letter provided an opportunity for "sowing
useful truths, & principles" and for explaining why he declined
to follow the tradition of his predecessors in designating days for
public fasting and thanksgiving. Jefferson had been criticized for
departing from the practice of his presidential predecessors and
virtually all state chief executives, who routinely designated days
for prayer, fasting, and thanksgiving.
The president was keenly aware of the political implications
of his pronouncement on a delicate church-state issue. Before
sending his considered response, Jefferson solicited the political
advice and comment of "his chief consultants on New England,"
Attorney General Levi Lincoln, a Massachusetts Republican,
and Postmaster General Gideon Granger, a Connecticut Republican.12 In a brief note to Lincoln, Jefferson remarked that
"the Baptist address ... furnishes an occasion too, which I have
long wished to find, of saying why I do not proclaim fastings &
thanksgivings, as my predecessors did. [T]he address to be sure
does not point at this, . . . but I foresee no opportunity of doing
it more pertinently. I know," the president candidly acknowledged, the response "will give great offence to the New England
clergy: but the advocate for religious freedom is to expect neither peace nor forgiveness from them. [W]ill you be so good,"
he asked Lincoln, "as to examine the answer and suggest any alterations which might prevent an ill effect, or promote a good
one, among the people? [Y]ou understand the temper of those in

10. For a useful analysis of the preliminary draft of the letter, see James Hutson, 'A
Wall of Separation': FBI Helps Restore Jefferson's Obliterated Draft, 57 The Library of
Congress Information Bulletin 136-39, 163 (June 1998).
11. Letter [rom Thomas Je££erson to Levi Lincoln (Jan. 1, 1802), in The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Series 1, Box 89, Dec. 2,
1801-Jan. 1, 1802. Also available in Dreisbach, 39 J. of Church & State at 465 (cited in
note 1).
12. Dumas Malone, Jefferson the President: First Term, 1801-1805 at 109 (Little,
Brown and Co., 1970). Je££erson's solicitation of advice from his cabinet officers further
controverts the claims of critics who discount or belittle the Danbury letter as a hastily
drafted little note of courtesy, lacking deliberation or precision.
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the North, and can weaken it therefore to their stomachs: it is at
13
present seasoned to the Southern taste only."
In compliance with the president's request, Lincoln perused
Jefferson's original reply and promptly returned his comments.
The attorney general counseled caution in the manner of Jefferson's expression. Not only the Federalists and Congregationalists, but also the Republicans in New England, he warned, might
be offended by Jefferson's departure from the ancient and venerable "habit of observing fasts and thanksgivings in perform14
ance of proclamations from their respective Executives."
Granger, whom Jefferson "entrusted with important party
responsibilities in Connecticut," registered less political concern
15
than Lincoln with Jefferson's response to the Danbury Baptists.
Indeed, he opined that Jefferson had expressed truths embraced
by the "great Majority" of New Englanders, including nearly half
the citizens of Connecticut. Therefore, he recommended that
not "a Sentence [be] changed," even though Jefferson's response
might "occasion a temporary Spasm among the Established Religionists. " 16
Jefferson considered the comments of Lincoln and Granger
and composed a revised copy of the letter to the Danbury Baptists. Jefferson wrote:
Gentlemen
The affectionate sentiments of esteem and approbation
which you are so good as to express towards me, on behalf of
the Danbury Baptist association, give me the highest satisfaction. [M]y duties dictate a faithful & zealous pursuit of the interests of my constituents, & in proportion as they are per-

13. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Levi Lincoln (Jan. 1, 1802), in The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson (cited in note 11). A careless reading of Jefferson's letter to Attorney
General Levi Lincoln is the source of the frequently repeated error that the Danbury
Baptists requested Jefferson to designate a day of public fasting and national thanksgiving. As the text indicates, Jefferson was well aware that the Baptists' request did not
touch on the matter.
14. Letter from Levi Lincoln to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 1, 1802), in The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Series 1, Box 89, Dec. 2,
1801-Jan. 1,1802. Also available in Dreisbach, 39 J. of Church & State at 466-67 (cited in
note 1).
15. Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds., 7 Dictionary of American Biography
483 {Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946).
16. Letter from Gideon Granger to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 1801), in The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Series 1, Box 89, Dec. 2,
1801-Jan. 1, 1802. Also available in Dreisbach, 39 J. of Church & State at 467 (cited in
note 1).

634

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 16:627

suaded of my fidelity to those duties, the discharge of them
becomes more and more pleasing.
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between Man & his God, that he owes account to none other
17
for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of
government reach actions only, & not opinions, I contemplate
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should "make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between
Church & State. [A]dhering to this expression of the supreme
will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall
see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments
which tend to restore to man all his natural rights, convinced
he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.
I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection & blessing of the common father and creator of man, and tender you
for yourselves & your religious association, assurances of my
18
high respect & esteem.

Memorable phrases and key principles in Jefferson's reply
correspond to language in the Baptists' address. Both letters, for
example, assert in similar language that religion is an essentially
private "matter which lies solely between Man & his God."
Both letters maintain that "the legitimate powers of government
reach actions only, & not opinions." The Baptists clearly drew
on themes Jefferson had championed in the celebrated "Statute
of Virginia for Establishing Religious Freedom" and his other
public pronouncements on the rights of conscience.
It is also striking, as historian Jon Butler observed, that
"Jefferson himself subtly shifted the First Amendment's meaning in the most complex ways" when he described an ideal "wall
of separation" between church and state. His use of "the term
church inevitably narrowed the meaning of an amendment concerned instead with religion and government." Jefferson's use of
the word "church" rather than "religion" in his restatement of
the First Amendment emphasized that the constitutional separa-

17. Most published collections of Jefferson's writings incorrectly transcribe this
word as "legislative."
18. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins,
and Stephen S. Nelson, a committee of the Danbury Baptist association in the state of
Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress}, Series 1, Box 89, Dec. 2, 1801-Jan. 1,1802.
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tion was between ecclesiastical institutions and the state. His
language, no doubt, appealed to pious, evangelical dissenters
who disapproved of established churches but believed religion
19
played an indispensable role in public life.
How much significance did Jefferson attach to the "wall of
separation" metaphor? Did he regard it as the defining motif of
his church-state views? No evidence has yet been discovered
that he ever again used the "wall" metaphor. Furthermore,
there is little evidence that Jefferson considered the "wall" the
quintessential symbolic expression or theme of his church-state
thought. And yet, Jefferson's metaphor has come to symbolize
church-state relations in the twentieth century. Judicial and
popular conceptions of a "wall" that separates religion from civil
government have led to sweeping changes in American public
life and political thought. For the last fifty years, Jefferson's
"wall" has been invoked by those seeking to restrict the role of
religion in public life, as well as by religious organizations seeking protection from intrusive government regulation.
But was this broad separationist principle really envisioned by Jefferson when he wrote that the First Amendment
built a "wall of separation between Church & State"? Is this interpretation rooted in Jefferson's text, or is it just an example of
interpreting early nineteenth-century writings with perceptions
formed in the twentieth century? In the following section,
Whaley argues that Jefferson indeed intended his First Amendment "wall" to be broadly interpreted. Dreisbach counters that
Jefferson's "wall" merely reflected the principle of federalism
inherent in the First Amendment; that the "wall of separation"
was erected only between the national government and religion,
leaving the states free to regulate religion as they saw fit.
II. A SEPARATIONIST INTERPRETATION OF THE
"WALL"
To interpret Jefferson's intended meaning for his "wall of
separation" metaphor is to enter treacherous waters. Before offering my interpretation, I briefly discuss two issues that influence an examination of church-state relationships in the American experience. First, any analysis is filtered through twentieth

19. Jon Butler, Coercion, Miracle, Reason: Rethinking the American Religious Experience in the Revolutionary Age, in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, eds., Religion
in a Revolutionary Age 1, 29-30 (U. Press of Virginia, 1994 ).
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century eyes; the relationship between church and state today
inevitably colors one's perception of its historical evolution.
Second, government's interaction with religion may affect, either
positively or negatively, one's religious expression, and one's religious beliefs may influence one's views of appropriate churchstate relations. Accordingly, I propose that any interpretation of
Jefferson's "wall of separation" cannot be entirely disentangled
from subjective opinion. 20
With that in mind, let me be candid about my position: I
support a strong wall of separation between church and state. I
believe that this "wall" has facilitated the amazing combination
of religiosity and religious diversity in the United States, a combination unmatched by any other nation. While I concede that
my analysis of Jefferson's "wall" cannot be entirely free from my
own sentiments in the matter, my examination of the issue is not
compromised. My position evolved over a significant period of
time wherein I began by agreeing with Dreisbach's jurisdictional
interpretation and then came to see its weaknesses. After more
thorough consideration, I became convinced that Dreisbach's
narrow argument misconstrued Jefferson's position.
Whereas Dreisbach takes a jurisdictional view of Jefferson's
"wall," I will argue that this metaphor was no mere reference to
federalism. Rather, my separationist interpretation sees Jefferson's metaphor for the First Amendment as a reflection of his
enlightened vision for America's future. My analysis begins by
exploring the underlying philosophical ideas that most influenced Jefferson and the other framers, focusing specifically on
the most plausible source for the "wall" metaphor, the Enlightenment figure James Burgh. With this foundation firmly in
place, I then turn to a careful analysis of the letters themselves.
A Historical Backdrop
Critics of a broad separationist interpretation of the First
Amendment often argue that modern analyses fail to conform to
the framers' original intent. Moreover, these critics claim that
current separationist readings of the First Amendment and Jef-

20. Erwin Chemerinsky agrees with my proposition, noting that "(h)istoriographers
persuasively argued that the process of historical examination is inevitably interpretive
and influenced by the values of the historian." Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 44, 92 (1989). According to Haig Bosmajian, church-state
cases have been particularly plagued by historical subjectivity. Haig Bosmajian, Is a Page
of History Worth a Volume of Logic?, 38 J. of Church & State 397,409 (1996).
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ferson's Danbury letter fail to place these documents in an appropriate historical context. In order to counter these critics,
this section provides a historical backdrop. In connection with
the introduction's brief description of the Second Great Awakening, this backdrop describes the dynamism of the postRevolutionary era, including the framers' philosophical vision
during this period of nation-building. The focus then turns to
Jefferson's own philosophy and to the Enlightenment reformer
who likely influenced his use of the "wall" metaphor, James
Burgh.
According to Gordon Wood, "[e]quality was in fact the
most radical and most powerful idealogical force let loose in the
Revolution." 21 Not surprisingly, the concept had wide appeal
among the lower and middle classes. But equality had a particularly attractive quality for the framers. It is common knowledge that most of the framers were wealthy land-owners. But
what is not generally known is that the vast majority of this influential group were first-generation gentleman. Nearly all of
them were the first in their families to get a college education.
Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Adams, John Adams, James Madison, James Otis, John Jay, Benjamin Rush and John Marshall
were among this group.
The framers were self-made and forward-looking. In fact,
as Wood noted, "[t]he vision of the revolutionary leaders is
breathtaking.... As hard-headed and practical as they were,
they knew that by becoming republican they were expressing
nothing less than a utopian hope for a new moral and social order led by enlightened and virtuous men. Their soaring dreams
and eventual disappointments make them the most extraordinary generation of political leaders in American history." 22
These men saw America's future through the eyes of the Enlightenment, and were determined to re-shape it by expelling the
darkness of the past. They hoped that America, through education and virtue, could exemplify the ideals set forth in the Enlightenment. Or, as Thomas Paine put it, "[t]he mind once enlightened cannot again become dark. "23

21. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution at 232 (cited in note 4). Sec
also Henry F. May, The Enlightenment in America (Oxford U. Press, 1976); Bernard
Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Belknap Press, 1967).
22. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution at 189-90 (cited in note 4).
23. Letter from Thomas Paine to Abbe Raynal (1782), in Moncure Daniel Conway,
ed., 2 The Writings of Thomas Paine 107 (AMS Press, 1967).
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Jefferson was an avid proponent of these Enlightenment
ideas and, therefore, questioned many assumptions of his day.
With regard to religion, Jefferson was particularly concerned
with the practice of church establishment. While government
support for religion was only sparsely applied to the colonies in
the seventeenth century, England had expanded establishment
in the early 1700's to promote and assert monarchical power.
Therefore, Jefferson and the framers had two reasons to oppose
establishment: reliance on the Enlightenment's critique of coerced religious faith, and opposition to a clerical authority that
symbolized British oppression.
Jefferson in particular expressed hostility towards clerical
leaders and ecclesiastical establishment. In a letter written the
year he was elected president, he wrote that "[t)he clergy, by getting themselves established by law, and ingrafted into the machine of government, have been a very formidable engine
against the civil and religious rights of man. " 24 Criticisms of religious establishment were common in Enlightenment thought,
particularly in the works of Paine and Locke. However, a lesserknown Enlightenment reformer, James Burgh, may have influenced even more Jefferson's profound distaste for institutional
religious authority. In fact, Burgh is the most plausible source
for Jefferson's "wall" metaphor in the Danbury letter. 25
While largely unknown until recently, this radical Whig
Commonwealthman has emerged in recent scholarship as a
prominent source of American revolutionary thought. 26 One of
many reform-minded thinkers in England at that time, Burgh
was part of a tight group of intellectuals that included Richard
Price and Joseph Priestley, along with other important reform
writers of the time, such as "Cato" (Trenchard and Gordon) and
24. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to J. Moor (Aug. 14, 1800), in Norman Cousins,
ed., In God We Trust: The Religious Beliefs and Ideas of the American Founding Fa1hers
130 (Harper & Brothers, 1958).
25. Others have opined that Roger Williams coined the "wall" metaphor; however,
evidence indicates that Burgh is a much more plausible source. For a discussion of this
issue, sec Dreisbach, 39 J. of Church & State at 481-90 (cited in note 1).
26. Carla H. Hay, James Burgh, Spokesman for Reform in Hanoverian England 4144 (U. Press of America, 1979). According to Hay, Political Disquisitions "quickly secured the status in England and in America of a monumental reference work with the
authority of a political classic. An impressive number of America's founding fathers and
virtually all the key figures in the English reform movement were indebted to the work."
ld. at 105. See also Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman:
Studies in the Transmission, Development and Circumstances of English Liberal Thought
from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies (Harvard U.
Press, 1959).
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Viscount Bolingbroke. 27 According to Isaac Kramnick, these
"English reformers of the American Revolutionary Era were, in
fact, committed partisans of modernity, of liberal individualism,
and of market society." 28 Current historians posit that James
29
Burgh was "the crucial figure" within this group. And Oscar
and Mary Handlin, the first twentieth century authors to focus
specifically on Burgh, argue that "he was as close to American
30
thought as any European of his time."
In one of his major themes, Burgh warned his readers of the
potential corrupting influence of ecclesiastical establishment. In
his work Crito, he argued that danger existed in "a church's getting too much power into her hands, and turning religion into a
mere state-engine." 31 He offered the metaphor of a "wall" as a
defense against religious establishment:
We have in our times a proof, from the conduct of some
among us, in respect of the [people's] appointment of their
public administrators of religion, that such a scheme will answer all the necessary purposes, and prevent infinite corruption;-ecclesiastical corruption; the most odious of all corruption.
Build an imP-enetrable wall of separation between things
32
sacred and civi/.

Burgh clearly argued against entanglement between church
and state. He believed that anything less than "an impenetrable
wall of separation between things sacred and civil" would lead to
societal corruption- the very corruption that his adversaries argued ecclesiastical establishment would prevent.
Jefferson highly regarded Burgh's work, and even urged
one of his books on Congress in 1803.33 In fact, in 1790 Jefferson
advised his future son-in-law, lawyer Thomas Mann Randolph,
27. Benjamin Franklin was a "guest member" of this group, visiting them when he
traveled to England. See Oscar and Mary Handlin, James Burgh and American Revolu·
rionary Theory, 73 Proceedings of the Massachusclls Historical Society 38, 42,52 (1961).
28. Isaac Kramnick, Republicanism Revisited: The Case of James Burgh, in Milton
M. Klein, Richard D. Brown, and John B. Hench, eds., The Republican Synthesis Revis·
ired: Essays in Honor of George Arhan Billias 19, 22 (American Antiquarian Society,
1992).
29. Id.
30. Oscar and Mary Handlin, 73 Proceedings of the Massachusells Historical Society at 57 (cited in note 27).
31. [James Burgh], 1 Criro, or Essays on Various Subjects 7 (J. Dodsley, 1766).
32. [James Burgh], 2 Criro, or Essays on Various Subjects 118-19 (J. Dodsley, 1767)
(emphasis in original).
33. Hay,James Burgh at43 (cited in note 26).
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that a young man preparing for a law career should read Adam
Smith, Montesquieu (with reservations), Locke's "little book on
government," the Federalist, and James Burgh's Political Disquistions.34 Given Jefferson's familiarity with and esteem for
Burgh, it is plausible that Burgh's prescription for an "impenetrable wall" influenced Jefferson when he depicted his vision for
the First Amendment in the Danbury letter.
In addition to Burgh's influence, a more immediate event
likely had an impact on Jefferson's response to the Danbury
Baptists. On the very day Jefferson wrote the Danbury letter, a
rather strange incident occurred in Washington. Arriving from a
small town in western Massachusetts was a "mammoth" cheese,
weighing some 1,235 pounds, which was presented to the president. This enormous gift was created by the townspeople of
Cheshire, Massachusetts under the supervision of the Elder John
Leland, the town's eccentric pastor and promoter of the project.Js
The careers of Leland and Jefferson had crossed paths
many times. Born in Massachusetts, Leland was ordained in
Virginia in 1777 where he had already "begun to acquire a statewide reputation for his vigorous, anecdotal, and somewhat eccentric manner of preaching. "36 Leland became an ardent proponent of Jefferson's reforms for Virginia in 1776. According to
C.A. Browne, "Leland's influence was a great factor in winning
the rank and file of Virginia's population to the support of Jef37
ferson's bill for the complete separation of church and state. "
After spending fourteen years in Virginia, Leland returned
to Massachusetts. Settling in Cheshire, Leland created a stronghold of Jeffersonian Republicanism in an ardently Federalist
state. 38 When news reached Cheshire that the House of Representatives had decided in favor of Jefferson over Burr, the town
erupted in celebration. On April 9, 1801 following Jefferson's
34. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph (May 30, 1790), in
Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, cds., 8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
29, 31 (Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904) (Monticello edition) ("Writings of
Jefferson").
35. C.A. Browne, Elder John Leland and the Mammoth Cheshire Cheese, 18 Agricultural History 145 ( 1944)
36. ld.
37. ld.
38. In Massachusetts gubernatorial elections from 1800-1808, out of the town's 200
eligible voters, only one consistently voted Federalist. L.H. Butterfield, Elder John
Leland, Jeffersonian Itinerant, 62 Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society 155,
215-16 (1952).
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inauguration, Leland delivered an enthusiastic sermon to commemorate the event.
Pardon me, my hearers, if I am over-warm. I lived in Virginia
fourteen years. The beneficent influence of my hero was too
generally felt to leave me stoic. What may we not expect, under the auspices of heaven, while JEFFERSON presides, with
Madison in state by his side. Now the greatest orbit in
America is occupied by its brightest orb: but, sirs, expect to
see religious bigots, like cashiered officers, and displaced
statesmen, growl and gnaw at their galling bands, and, like
39
yelping mastiff, bark at the moon rising they cannot prevent.

Leland's reverence for Jefferson stemmed primarily from
the president's historical commitment to church-state separation.
In 1829, as Massachusetts was debating ecclesiastical disestablishment, Leland contended that "Thomas Jefferson did more
than any one man to bring the felonious principle [of establishment] to the stake."40
In the summer immediately following Jefferson's inauguration, Leland conceived of a grand plan both to commemorate
the event and to promote Cheshire's chief agricultural commodity. This project involved collecting the curds of every cow
within the precinct of Cheshire (Federalist cows were excluded,
however), and pressing these curds into one mammoth cheese.
The cheese, over four feet in diameter and seventeen inches
thick, was then transported to Washington and presented to the
president.
As it traveled by boat and horse-drawn cart down the eastern seaboard, the cheese attracted a great deal of publicity.
Many articles and editorials were written about the maml\loth
cheese and, as the newspapers of the day were typically of a solid
Federalist or Republican bent, they bestowed either ridicule or
praise respectively upon the gift.
No doubt Jefferson was caught up in the excitement that accompanied the arrival of the cheese in Washington. Newspaper
reports described him standing in the doorway of the White
House as the cheese made its way down Pennsylvania Avenue. 41
One eyewitness wrote that "If I can judge from Mr. Jefferson's
39. L.H. Greene, ed., The Writings of the Late Elder John Leland 255 (New York,
1845).
40. Id. at 553.
41. See, e.g .• National Intelligence and Washington Advertiser 2 (Jan. 20, 1802);
Washington Federalist 3 (Jan. 2, 1802); Boston Independent Chronicle 2 (Jan. 25, 1802).
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countenance he is highly diverted with the present curiosity, as
all alive people are flocking in from all quarters to see the New
42
England mammoth. " Leland himself presented the cheese to
the president. In his address to Jefferson, Leland insisted that
the town's "attachment to the National Constitution is indissoluble." Leland praised the Constitution for its "beautiful features-the right of free suffrage to correct abuses, the prohibition of religious tests to prevent all hierarchy, and the means of
amendment which it contains within itself to remove defects as
43
fast as they are discovered." Jefferson responded to the address with a written response of his own, in which he concurred
with Leland on the virtues of the Constitution. Two days later,
Jefferson further demonstrated his solidarity with Leland as he
sat in attendance while Leland preached a sermon in the U.S.
capitol.
Given the spectacle created by the mammoth cheese, this
event was undoubtedly on Jefferson's mind as he drafted the
Danbury letter. Added to the impact of the cheese's arrival was
the presence of John Leland, the man who had supported Jefferson so steadfastly in Virginia during his battle to enact the "Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom." It would seem, therefore, that while Jefferson was responding to the Danbury
Baptist's views on church-state relations, Jefferson must have
also been thinking about his life-long commitment to churchstate separation, and the battles he had fought to establish this
principle in Virginia.
The Danbury Correspondence
A grasp of the historical context is crucial before one attempts to divine Jefferson's "wall of separation." So too is familiarity with all the relevant correspondence surrounding the
Danbury letter. This section focuses specifically on the first version of Jefferson's reply, and his written exchanges with Attorney General Levi Lincoln and Postmaster General Gideon
Granger. Through careful analysis of these letters and their effect on Jefferson's final reply to the Danbury Baptists, I believe
42. Letter from Benjamin Robinson (Jan. 1, 1802), in Browne, 18 Agricultural History at 151 (cited in note 35).
43. Letter from Daniel Brown, Hezekiah Mason, Jonathan Richardson, John Waterman, and John Wells, Jr. to Thomas Jefferson, in Browne, 18 Agricultural History at
150 (cited in note 35). While this letter was signed by the aforementioned citizens of
Cheshire, it was most likely written by Leland himself. Id. at 150 n.l4; Butterfield, 62
Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society at 224 (cited in note 38).
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one can glean a clear understanding of Jefferson's intention for
the "wall of separation." This interpretation directly contradicts
Dreisbach's jurisdictional argument, to which I will refer in my
analysis.
Dreisbach argues that Jefferson's "wall of separation" was
not addressing the broad issue of separation between religion
and civil government. Rather, "the principal importance of his
'wall,"' Dreisbach opines, "like the First Amendment it metaphorically represents, is its clear delineation of the legitimate jurisdictions of federal and state governments on religious matters.
In short, the 'wall' constructed by Jefferson separated the federal
regime, on one side, and ecclesiastical institutions and state governments, on the other."44 Dreisbach rightly notes that both the
Danbury address to Jefferson and his reply include acknowledgment of the federalism aspects of the First Amendment. In
their letter the Baptists observed: "Sir, we are sensible that the
President of the [U]nited States, is not the national Legislator, &
also sensible that the national government cannot destroy the
Laws of each State." As for Jefferson, he quoted the First
Amendment's prescription that "their legislature should 'make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof."' "Their" or the people's legislature certainly applies to Congress, rather than state legislatures. And as
Dreisbach's impressive collection of evidence attests, Jefferson
certainly acknowledged and supported the principle of federalism embedded in the Bill of Rights.
The issue before us, however, is not Jefferson's views on
federalism. Rather, we seek to ascertain his understanding of
the "wall" metaphor as expressed in his reply to the Danbury
Baptists. A complete reading of that document reveals that Jefferson had more in mind than merely restating jurisdictional
principles. There is no doubt that the Danbury Baptists wrote to
Jefferson because they were a marginalized religious minority in
Connecticut. Their religious privileges were "enjoy[ed] as favors
granted, and not as inalienable rights." A strict federalism
reading of Jefferson's "wall" would not change this situation;
Connecticut could continue discriminating against religious minorities, regardless of the First Amendment.
Jefferson's reply offers a much more supportive and optimistic view of the Danbury Baptists' plight than the jurisdic-

44.

See below, p. 649.
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tional view will allow. Looking at the middle and most crucial
paragraph of his reply again, it seems clear that Jefferson's focus
was on religious liberty, not federalism. If the jurisdictional argument holds, then this paragraph's most compelling elements
seem oddly out of place. A jurisdictional interpretation would
maintain that Jefferson "contemplate[d] with sovereign reference" solely the federalism component of the First Amendment.
Assuming for a moment that Jefferson was merely referring to
federalism in the First Amendment, how does "adhering to this
expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the
rights of conscience" lead to "the progress of those sentiments
which tend to restore to man all his natural rights ... "(my emphasis)? Does it follow that merely limiting the role of the federal government in matters of religion (while allowing the states
to discriminate at will) would lead to this type of "progress"? I
45
think not.
Let us now turn to a lesser known piece of the Danbury
puzzle: the first version of Jefferson's reply. It is in this document that Jefferson first employs his "wall of separation" metaphor; therefore, its relevance to the present discussion is apparent. In order to further highlight its relevance, I would rebut the
assumption that this document is merely a rough draft. For this
purpose and in order to examine the document in detail, I reproduce it here in full.
To messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, & Stephen
S. Nelson a committee of the Danbury Baptist association in
the state of Connecticut.
Gentlemen
The affectionate sentiments of esteem & approbation
which you are so good as to express towards me, on behalf of
the Danbury Baptist association, give me the highest satisfaction. [M]y duties dictate a faithful & zealous pursuit of the interests of my constituents, and, in proportion as they are persuaded of my fidelity to those duties, the discharge of them
becomes more & more pleasing.
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man & his god, that he owes account to none other

45. One might argue that the last sentence was merely a flowery offering of solidarity. However, given that it is the summary sentence of the primary paragraph, rather
than in the closing, this seems unlikely.
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for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only and not opinions, I contemplate
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
46
exercise thereof; thus building a wall of separation between
church and state. [Congress thus inhibited from acts respecting religion, and the Executive authorised only to execute
their acts, I have refrained from prescribing even occasional
performances of devotion, prescribed indeed legally where an
Executive is the legal head of a national church, but subject
here, as religious exercises only to the voluntary regulations
and discipline of each respective sect.)t [A)dhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the
rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the
progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all
his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.
I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection and
blessing of the common father and creator of man, and tender
you for yourselves and your religious association, assurances
of my high respect & esteem.
Th: Jefferson
7
Jan. 1. 180i
t Jefferson circled the sentence in brackets and added the
following note in the margin: "this paragraph was omitted on
the suggestion that it might give uneasiness to some of our republican friends in the eastern States where the proclamation
of thanksgivings etc [?) by their Executive is an antient habit,
& is respected."

46. Jefferson made a number of changes to this document, including many ponions
that were scratched out and are now illegible. It appears that he originally wrote "thus
building a wall of eternal separation," but then scratched out the word "eternal." This is
strikingly similar in tone to Burgh's decree, which encouraged his fellow citizens to
"build an impenetrable wall of separation." Or perhaps, as Dreisbach offers in his work,
Jefferson's choice of "eternal" reflects his other uses of the word, such as in his 1800 letter to Benjamin Rush: "I have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility against
every form of tyranny over the mind of man." Dreisbach, 39J. of Church & State at 462
n.l3 (cited in note 1).
47. Preliminary draft of letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge,
Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S. Nelson, a committee of the Danbury Baptist association in the state of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Series 1, Box 89, Dec. 2, 1801-Jan. 1, 1802. Also
available in Dreisbach, 39J. of Church & State at 462 (cited in note 1).
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For the moment, ignore the content of the document and
how it contrasts with the final version. Notice that Jefferson included both the full greeting and dated closing in this letter, formatted identically as that of his final reply. Moreover, his letter
to Levi Lincoln describes the document as his "answer," rather
than as a draft. Gideon Granger insisted that Jefferson send it as
is, wishing not "a Sentence changed." There is also the question
why Jefferson saved the document at all, and the fact that he explained in the margin why he omitted the section, as if it pained
him significantly to do so. At the very least, the evidence attests
to this document's relevance in interpreting Jefferson's understanding of the "wall" metaphor, an opinion which Dreisbach
shares. Moreover, I would argue that the above observations indicate that Jefferson could very well have intended to send this
version, but at the last moment drafted a revised version after
further considering the political ramifications of the letter. This
theory supports the idea that Jefferson realized the Danbury letter was a significant and broad statement on the First Amendment's church-state prescriptions. 48
Looking at the document's content, we first notice that Jefferson included an explanation as to why he had "refrained from
prescribing even occasional performances of devotion." In his
letter to Lincoln, Jefferson wrote that the Danbury address "furnishes an occasion too, which I have long wished to find, of saying why I do not proclaim fastings & thanksgivings, as my predecessors did." The word "too" makes it clear that Jefferson
wished to kill two birds with one stone: one, to make a statement
49
about religious liberty as per the Danbury Baptists' request,
and two, to explain why he refrained from issuing religious
proclamations as president. Since Jefferson in the end deleted
any mention of the latter in his final reply, we can only assume
that the letter is about religious liberty.

48. One could argue that Jefferson's final copy was sufficiently watered down to
discount the letter being a "significant and broad statement on the First Amendment's
church-state prescriptions," supporting the letter's jurisdictional intent. I would counter
that the following investigation of the first copy, combined with my previous analysis,
points to the "wall of separation" as a symbol of religious liberty beyond the minimal
guarantees which federalism provided.
49. Constance B. Schulz described the purpose of the letter as Jefferson's way of
communicating his true convictions on matters of faith and morality to loyal "Republicans in New England, who might be sensitive to or confused by" the Federalist press's
unrelenting attacks on Jefferson's alleged immorality and irreligion. "Of Bigotry in Politics and Religion": Jefferson's Religion, the Federalist Press, and the Syllabus, 91 Virginia
Magazine of History and Biography 73,85-86 (1983).
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Importantly, this document shows that the omitted sentence
is the transitional section linking the "wall" metaphor and its
"progress." Note that at the end of the sentence, Jefferson did
not write "of each respective state," but rather "sect." Further,
notice that these "regulations and discipline" were "voluntary."
He therefore saw religious exercises as the sole responsibility of
the sects themselves, not of any government authority, neither
state nor federal. This sentence, which directly follows the
"wall" metaphor, seems to contradict the jurisdictional interpretation.
In fact, it was this crucial "linking" sentence that Lincoln
saw as the most politically dangerous. In his reply to Jefferson,
Lincoln offered a specific editorial point, so that Jefferson's reply would not be seen as an "implied censure" of the right of the
states to impose their will. His editorial recommendation is inserted here in italics: " ... only to the voluntary regulations &
discipline of each respective sect, as mere religious exercises, and
to the particular situations, usages & recommendations of the several states, in point of time & local circumstances." If Jefferson's
intention for the "wall" parallels the jurisdictional argument,
then why did he not include Lincoln's suggestion, rather than
omitting the entire section and leaving it disjointed and ambiguous? Looking at Jefferson's first version in conjunction with the
final version, I would argue that his intentions are clear: he believed that the First Amendment constructed a "wall of separation" that offered the potential for true religious liberty, in contrast to other nations where "an Executive is the legal head of a
national church." Indeed, as the phrase "but subject here [in the
United States]" implies, matters of religion should be left solely
"to the voluntary regulations and discipline of each respective
sect." It is this expression of the people that Jefferson hoped
would eventually lead to the "progress of those sentiments which
tend to restore to man all his natural rights." Only with the entire section intact does Jefferson's intent for the letter and its
"wall of separation" become clear.
This broad interpretation of Jefferson's "wall" gains further
strength when taken in historical context. As outlined in the beginning of this section, the Enlightenment promoted radical
ideas for its time. And Jefferson was at the forefront of this
movement in the United States, often promoting the most radical of Enlightenment ideas. Of particular importance to Jefferson was the abolition of ecclesiastical establishment. To have
such an avid proponent as John Leland arrive in Washington on
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New Year's Day (bearing a 1,200 pound cheese, no less), could
only have provided further inspiration for church-state separation as he wrote his Danbury response.
Furthermore, James Burgh's influence on Jefferson supports the argument that Jefferson intended his "wall of separation between Church & State" to be a broad and futuristic vision
for American church-state relations. It is interesting to note that
Burgh dedicated his book Crito, in which he argued for an "impenetrable wall of separation," to "The Good People of Britain
of the twentieth century," because he believed his contemporaries were incapable of heeding his advice. 50 Similarly, Jefferson
realized that the First Amendment's "wall of separation" was an
idea that would be fully realized over time. In his letter to Lincoln, Jefferson expressed the hope that his vision for the First
Amendment would "sow[] useful truths & principles among the
people, which might germinate and become rooted among their
political tenets. " 51
It seems only fitting that in the twentieth century, an era in
which Burgh hoped people would have finally attained sufficient
wisdom to appreciate his ideas, that Jefferson's vision of the
First Amendment would become an inescapable part of the
American conscience. In fact, Jefferson's "wall" has come to
symbolize the First Amendment. 52 Jefferson's visionary "wall of
separation between Church & State" has brought our nation unparalleled religious freedom, for both the believer and nonbeliever. To interpret the "wall" metaphor in such a broad and
enlightened manner would no doubt please Jefferson, a man
who so changed his own time and who had such high hopes for a
virtuous American future.
50. 2 Crito, Preface (cited in note 32) (emphasis in original).
51. That is not to say, however, that the growth of these "truths and principles" had
not already begun to take root. The Danbury Baptists' address points to their strong desire for true religious liberty (without the shackles of state establishment allowed under
federalism).
52. As R. Freeman Butts noted, Jefferson's "words 'a wall of separation between
church and state' are not simply a metaphor of one private citizen's language; they reflect
accurately the intent of those most responsible for the First Amendment; and they carne
to reflect the majority will of the American people. The words 'separation of church and
state' arc an accurate and convenient shorthand meaning of the First Amendment itself;
they represent a well-defined historical principle from the pen of one who in many official statements and actions helped to frame the authentic American tradition of political
and religious liberty." R. Freeman Butts, The American Tradition in Religion and Education 93 (Beacon Press, 1950). Edwin S. Gaustad similarly noted that "Jefferson's 'wall
of separation' phrase, to be found nowhere in the Constitution, carne to grow more familiar than the constitutional language itself." Edwin S. Gaustad, Sworn on the Altar of
God: A Religious Biography of Thomas Jefferson 99 (Wrn. B. Eerdrnans Pub. Co., 1996).
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III. A JURISDICfiONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
"WALL"
The "wall" Jefferson erected in his letter to the Danbury
Baptists served primarily to separate state and nation in matters
pertaining to religion rather than to separate ecclesiastical from
all governmental authorities. Jefferson did not use the "wall" to
articulate a general, universal theory of the prudential relationship between religion and all civil government. The principal
importance of his "wall," like the First Amendment it metaphorically represents, is its clear delineation of the legitimate jurisdictions of federal and state governments on religious matters.
In short, the "wall" constructed by Jefferson separated the federal regime, on one side, and ecclesiastical institutions and state
governments, on the other. This jurisdictional interpretation of
the metaphor is rooted in the text, structure, and historic, preFourteenth Amendment understanding of the Bill of Rights, in
general, and the First Amendment, in particular. This view is
buttressed by the text of the Danbury letter (including evidence
gleaned from a preliminary draft), as well as by Jefferson's explanation of the letter and his stance on specific church-state issues apparently addressed in his correspondence with the Baptists.
Federalism and the Bill of Rights
Jefferson's "wall of separation" was a figurative device used
to illuminate the First Amendment, which explicitly prohibited
Congress from making laws "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The metaphor's
meaning cannot exceed the scope of the First Amendment. The
Constitution provided for a national government of limited,
strictly delegated, and enumerated powers. Those matters not
entrusted to the federal government were assumed to be reserved by the individual or the states (so far as they legitimately
resided in any governmental authority). "American federalism
as formulated in the Constitution," Mark DeWolfe Howe noted,
"made national disability the rule and national power the excep53
tion. " Since the new federal government had delegated powers
53. Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional History 19-20 (U. of Chicago Press, 1965). In The Federalist Papers, James Madison observed that "[t)he powers delegated by the proposed
ConstJtut10n to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain
in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. . . . The powers reserved to the
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only, and affirmative power in the religious sphere had not been
so delegated, it was acknowledged that authority over religious
matters was not extended to the federal regime, and the states
were free to maintain their own church-state arrangements and
policies. Moreover, by imposing its restrictions specifically on
"Congress," the First Amendment affirmed, by implication, that
the states retained authority to determine church-state policies
within their respective jurisdictions. 54 Neither the Article VI,
clause 3 ban on religious tests for federal officeholders nor the
First Amendment religion provisions were "laid upon the individual states. . . . Broad as were the principles upon which the
national government was based, the matter of church establishment or dis-establishment, of taxation compulsory or voluntary
contribution, of test acts, oaths and religious qualifications for
office, was left entirely to the discretion of the sovereign
states." 55 Indeed, some states retained religious establishments
well into the nineteenth century. Each state was free to define
the content and scope of civil and religious liberties and to structure church-state arrangements pursuant to its own constitution,
declaration of rights, and statutes. 56 In short, ratification of the
Constitution in 1788 and the Bill of Rights in 1791 had no immediate legal effect on church-state arrangements in the states and
altered nothing in matters regarding federal involvement with
religion. They merely made explicit the jurisdictional policies
that were already implicit in the constitutional order.
The federal Bill of Rights, which included the First
Amendment, served a dual purpose: to assure the citizenry that
the federal government would not encroach upon the civil and
several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." The Federalist 45 (Madison), in Ointon Rossiter, ed.,
The Federalist Papers 288, 292-93 (Mentor Books, 1961 ).
54. See Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Cliluse: A Federalist View, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1700, 1706-07 (1992) (the word "Congress" emphasizes the
federalism component of the First Amendment); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of
the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1106, 1111-12 (1994) (same). See also EdwardS. Corwin, The Supreme Court
as National School Board, in A Constitution of Powers in a Secular Stale 89, 109 (Michie
Co., 1951) ("the First Amendment, taken by itself, is binding only on Congress").
55. Joseph Francis Thorning, Religious Liberty in Transition 4 (Benzige Brothers,
1931).
56. The First Amendment, it should be noted, denied the national government jurisdiction over religion not because religion was thought unimportant or because governmental support for religion was generally regarded as improper, but rather because
jurisdiction in issues pertaining to "establishment" and government regulation of religion
were thought appropriately reserved by the states.
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religious liberties of individuals, and to guarantee the states that
the federal government would not usurp the states' jurisdiction
over civil and religious liberties. 57 The Bill of Rights embodied a
principle of federalism; it was essentially a states' rights document. "Indeed, the federalism of the Bill of Rights was widely
regarded in 1791 as far more important than the protection it afforded to the individual. Odd as it may seem today, the First
Amendment was not only a guarantee to the individual that
Congress could not establish a national religion, but also a guarantee to the states that they were free to determine the meaning
of religious establishment within their jurisdictions, and to newl~
8
establish, maintain, or disestablish religion as they saw fit."
This accords with Edward S. Corwin's observation that "the
principal importance of the [First) Amendment lay in the separation which it effected between the respective jurisdictions of
State and nation regarding religion, rather than in its bearing on
the question of the Separation of Church and State." 59
57. James McClellan, Joseph Story and the American Constitution: A Study in Political and Legal Thought 146 (U. of Oklahoma Press, 1971). Note also the view of Thomas Jefferson, who wrote to James Madison in July 1788: "I hope therefore a bill of
rights will be formed to guard the people against the federal government, as they are already guarded against their state governments in most instances." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in Julian P. Boyd, ed., 13 The Papers of
Thomas Jefferson 440, 443 (Princeton U. Press, 1956) ("Papers of Jefferson"). See also
Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment 134-36, 182 (Harvard U. Press, 1977).
58. James McClellan, The Making and the Unmaking of the Establishment Clause,
in Patrick B. McGuigan and Randall R. Rader, eds., A Blueprint for Judicial Reform 295,
314-15 (Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, 1981) (footnote omitted).
59. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board at 106 (cited in note 54).
See also Howe, The Garden and the Wildernes at 29 (cited in note 53) ("the federalism of
the First Amendment may be even more important than its libertarianism."). For other
works that argue that the specific purpose of the First Amendment religion provisions
was to preserve state sovereignty over religious matters, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill
of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131 (1991); Chester James Antieau, Arthur T.
Downey, and Edward C. Roberts, Freedom From Federal Establishment: Formation and
Early History of the First Amendment Religion Clauses (Bruce, 1964); Jonathan P. Brose,
In Birmingham They Love the Governor: Why the Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Incorporate the Establishment Clause, 24 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1 (1998); Daniel 0. Conkle,
Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1113 (1988);
Wilber G. Katz, Religion and American Constitutions 8-10 (Northwestern U. Press, 1964);
Oifton B. Kruse, Jr., The Historical Meaning and Judicial Construction of the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment, 2 Washburn L.J. 65 (1962); Kurt T.
Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 Ariz. State L.J. 1085 (1995) (arguing that the "original Establishment
Clause expressed the principle of federalism"; however, the Establishment Clause was
adopted a second time through the Fourteenth Amendment, and it then prohibited both
state and federal governments from supporting or suppressing religion); James McOellan, Hand's Writing on the Wall of Separation: The Significance of Jaffree in Future Cases
on Religious Establishment, in Robert A. Goldwin and Art Kaufman, eds., How Does the
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This was the prevailing interpretation of the Bill of Rights
and the First Amendment shared by Jefferson and his contemporaries. Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for a united Court
in Barron v. Baltimore, declared that the liberties guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights "contain no expression indicating an intention
to apply them to the state governments. "60 Specifically addressing religious liberty under the Constitution, the Supreme Court
ruled unanimously in Permoli v. Municipality that "[t]he Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state
constitutions and laws: nor is there any inhibition imposed by the
Constitution of the United States in this respect on the states."61
Justice Joseph Story concurred in his authoritative Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. The purpose of the
First Amendment, he wrote, was "to exclude from the national
government all power to act upon the subject [ofreligion]." 62 He
further opined that "the whole power over the subject of religion
is left exclusively to the state governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice, and the state constitutions .... "63
Jefferson embraced this jurisdictional view, which was virtually unchallenged in the founding era. In an 1808 letter to the
Reverend Samuel Miller, written, like the Danbury Baptist letter, to explain his refusal to issue thanksgiving day proclamations, Jefferson wrote: "I consider the government of the United
States as interdicted by the Constitution from intermeddling
with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or exerConstitution Protect Religious Freedom? 43 (American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1987); William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 1191 (1990); Note, Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 Harv. L.
Rev. 1700 (1992); Stuart D. Poppel, Federalism, Fundamental Fairness, and the Religion
Clauses, 25 Cumberland L. Rev. 247 (1995); Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment
and the Fourteenth Amendment, Wash. U. L.Q. 371 (1954); Michael A. Paulsen, Religion,
EqUJJiity, and the Constitution: An EqUIJI Protection Approach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 311 (1986); William C. Porth and Robert P.
George, Trimming the Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishment Clause,
90 West Virginia L. Rev. 109 (1987); Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest
for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom 17-54 (Oxford U. Press, 1995).
60. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243,250 (1833).
61. Permoli v. Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589,609 (1845).
62. Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 730 (Hilliard, Gray, and Co., 1833).
63. !d. at 731. See also id. at 728 ("The real object of the [first) amendment was ...
to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, an,d to prevent any national ecclesiastical
establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national
government.").
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cises. This results not only from the provision that no law shall
be made respecting the establishment or free exercise of religion
[First Amendment], but from that also which reserves to the
States the powers not delegated to the United States [Tenth
Amendment]. Certainly, no power to prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume authority in religious discipline, has been
delegated to the General [i.e., federal] Government. It must
then rest with the States, as far as it can be in any human
authority." 64 (Note how Jefferson tied together the First and
Tenth Amendments to explain his reasons, rooted in federalism,
for refusing to appoint a day for religious observance.) Jefferson
thought other important First Amendment rights were similarly
subject to state jurisdiction. For example, notwithstanding his
commitment to a free press, he acknowledged in an 1804 letter
to Abigail Adams that, as a matter of federalism, regulation of
the press was a matter of state sovereignty: "While we deny that
Congress have a right to control the freedom of the press, we
have ever asserted the right of the States, and their exclusive
right, to do so." 65 Jefferson and his contemporaries firmly believed the states provided a valuable check on the abuse of rights
by the federal regime. 66
64.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Reverend Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in

11 Writings of Jefferson at 428 (cited in note 34). See also James Madison's argument in

the Virginia ratifying convention: "There is not a shadow of right in the general [federal J
government to intermeddle with religion. Its least interference with it, would be a most
flagrant usurpation." Jonathan Elliot, ed., 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 313 (Privately Printed for Jonathan Elliot, 2d
ed. 1836).
65. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (Sept. 11, 1804 ), in 11 Writ·
ings of Jefferson at 49,51 (cited in note 34).
66. As early as 1798, Jefferson elaborated on this theme in his draft of "The Kentucky Resolutions" written in opposition to the Alien and Sedition Laws:
Resolved, That it is true as a general principle, and is also expressly declared by
one of the amendments to the Constitution, that "the powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, arc reserved to the States respectively, or to the people"; and that no power over the
freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press being delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, all
lawful powers respecting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the
States or the people: that thus was manifested their determination to retain to
themselves the right of judging how far the licentiousness of speech and of the
press may be abridged without lessening their useful freedom, and how far
those abuses which cannot be separated from their use should be tolerated,
rather than the use be destroyed. And thus also they guarded against all
abridgment by the United States of the freedom of religious opinions and exercises, and retained to themselves the right of protecting the same, as this State,
by a law passed on the general demand of its citizens, had already protected
them from all human restraint or interference. And that in addition to this general principle and express declaration, another and more special provision has
been made by one of the amendments to the Constitution, which expressly de-
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Strictly speaking, Jefferson's "wall" was a metaphoric construction of the First Amendment, which governed relations between religion and the national government. His "wall," therefore, did not and could not specifically address relations between
religion and state authorities. It is not self-evident that Jefferson
thought the metaphor, more generally, usefully represented a
universal, prudential doctrine of church-state relations governing
the interaction between religion and all civil government-local,
67
state, and federal. Jefferson's "wall" expressly described the
First Amendment and, thus, is appropriately construed in the
context of the federalist design for the Bill of Rights. 68
dares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or
of the press": thereby guarding in the same sentence, and under the same
words, the freedom of religion, of speech, and of the press: insomuch, that
whatever violates either, throws down the sanctuary which covers the others,
and that libels, falsehood, and defamation, equally with heresy and false religion, are withheld from the cognizance of federal tribunals.
Thomas Jefferson, Drafts of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 (Nov. 1798), in Paul
Leicester Ford, ed., 8 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 463-65 (G.P. Putnam's Sons, Federal ed. 1904). Significantly, Jefferson coupled the Tenth and First Amendments and
argued that power over religion, speech, and press was reserved to the state governments
or the people. See generally Snee, 1954 Wash. U. L.Q. at 390-92 (cited in note 59);
Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination of the Man and
the Metaphor, B.Y.U. L. Rev. 645,654-55 (1978).
67. In the light of the text and structure of the First Amendment, it is also appropriate to think of the First Amendment religion provisions as a restriction on civil government only and not a restraint on religion (or the role of religion in public life). Inasmuch as a wall is a bilateral, rather than a unilateral, barrier that not only prevents civil
government from invading the ecclesiastical domain, as intended by the architects of the
First Amendment, but also prohibits religion and the church from influencing the conduct of civil government, then the "wall" metaphor mischaracterizes the First Amendment. The various guarantees in the First Amendment were entirely a check or restraint
on civil government, specifically the national legislature. The free press guarantee, for
example, was not written to protect the civil state from the press, rather it was designed
to protect a free and independent press from control or interference by the federal government. Similarly, the religion provisions were added to the Constitution to protect religion and religious institutions from rough or corrupting interference by the federal government, and not to protect the civil state from the influence of, or overreaching by,
religion. In other words, the First Amendment prohibition on religious establishment
was a clear restraint on the power of civil government (i.e., the federal government) to
give legal preference to any single sect or combination of sects or to invade the religious
domain. Any construction of Jefferson's "wall" that imposes restraints on entities other
than civil government exceeds the limitations imposed by the First Amendment, from
which the "wall" metaphor was explicitly derived.
68. See J. M. O'Neill, Religion and Education Under the Constitution 67-69, 79-83
(Harper & Brothers, 1949) (arguing that Jefferson's "wall" separated the federal government and one religion); Snee, 1954 Wash. U. L. Q. at 389 (cited in note 59) (arguing
that Jefferson's "wall" affirmed the principle of federalism); Robert L. Cord, Separation
of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction 115 (Lambeth Press, 1982) ("By
this phrase Jefferson could only have meant that the 'wall of separation' was erected 'between church and State' in regard to possible federal action .... Therefore, to leave the
impression that Jefferson's 'separation' statement was a universal one concerning the
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Thanksgiving Day Proclamations and the "Wall of Separation"
In his correspondence with Levi Lincoln, Jefferson said the
Danbury letter "furnishes an occasion too, which I have long
wished to find, of saying why I do not proclaim fastings &
69
thanksgivings, as my predecessors did. "
Jefferson perhaps
wanted to address this topic because fast-day proclamations had
emerged as a sensitive political issue in the days leading up to
the election of 1800. President John Adams's recommendation
for a national "day of solemn humiliation, fasting, and prayer,"
issued in March 1799,70 was used by his political adversaries to
depict him as a tool of conservative religionists intent on establishing a national church. "A general suspicion prevailed," Adams recounted more than a decade later, "that the Presbyterian
Church [which was presumed to be behind the proclamation]
was ambitious and aimed at an establishment as a national
church." While disclaiming any involvement in such a scheme,
Adams ruefully reported that he "was represented as a Presbyterian [which he was not] and at the head of this political and ecclesiastical project. The secret whisper ran though all the sects,
'Let us have Jefferson, Madison, Burr, anybody, whether they be
philosophers, Deists, or even atheists, rather than a Presbyterian
71
President."' This reservoir of opposition to "national fasts and
thanksgivings," according to Adams, cost him the election in
1800. Jefferson was the political beneficiary, if not the instigator,
of this sentiment and, no doubt, was eager to go on the record
denouncing presidential religious proclamations. This episode
challenges the often repeated claim that Jefferson steadfastly rewhole of the federal and state political system is extremely misleading."); M. Stanton Evans, The Theme Is Freedoi'TL· Religion, Politics, and the American Tradition 288 (Rcgnery
Pub. Inc., 1994) ("The wall of separation, instead, was between the federal government
and the states, [and was] meant to make sure the central authority didn't meddle with the
customs of local jurisdictions."); Comment, 1978 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 656-59 (cited in note
66) (arguing that Jefferson's "wall" was a study in federalism, and the "wall" described in
the Danbury letter was erected only against the federal government).
69. Jefferson's final version of the Danbury letter did not explicitly mention the
issue of "fastings & thanksgivings," and it would not be apparent from the text that this
was the original object of the address were it not for his letter to Levi Lincoln. The "performances of devotion" is an oblique reference to the practice of "fastings & thanksgivings" mentioned in the preliminary draft.
70. Proclamation for a National Fast (Mar. 6, 1799), in Charles Francis Adams, ed.,
9 The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States 172-74 (Little, Brown
and Co., 1854).
71. Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush (June 12, 1812), in John A. Schutz
and Douglass Adair, eds., The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and Benjamin
Rush, /805-1813 at 224 (Huntington Library, 1966). Sec generally Gaustad, Sworn on the
Altar of God at 94-96 (cited in note 52).
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fused to issue religious proclamations despite substantial political costs, thereby emphasizing that his position was principled.
Clearly, political benefits, as well as costs, accompanied action
on either side of this controversial practice.
Although President Jefferson refused to appoint a national
day for public fasting and thanksgiving, his general views on the
propriety of such proclamations by civil magistrates is not entirely free of ambiguity. In the Danbury letter, Jefferson concluded that the First Amendment prohibited the president of the
United States from issuing religious proclamations. Yet, as
president, he employed rhetoric in official utterances that, in
terms of religious content, was virtually indistinguishable from
the traditional thanksgiving day proclamations issued by his
presidential predecessors and state chief executives. 72 In his first
annual message, for example, he wrote: "While we devoutly return thanks to the beneficent Being who has been pleased to
breathe into them the spirit of conciliation and forgiveness, we
are bound with peculiar gratitude to be thankful to him that our
own peace has been preserved through so perilous a season, and
ourselves permitted quietly to cultivate the earth and to practice
and improve those arts which tend to increase our comforts." 73
His second annual message to Congress opened with the following thanksgiving: "When we assemble together, fellow citizens, to consider the state of our beloved country, our just attentions are first drawn to those pleasing circumstances which mark
the goodness of that Being from whose favor they flow, and the
74
large measure of thankfulness we owe for his bounty." His
public papers are replete with similar expressions of thanksgiving and devotion. More important to the present discussion, Jefferson had a hand in crafting proclamations for religious observances when he was an elected official in his native
Commonwealth. A careful scrutiny of Jefferson's public record

72. See John G. West, Jr., The Politics of Revelation and Reason: Religion and Civic
Life in the New Nation 57 (U. Press of Kansas, 1996).
73. Thomas Jefferson, First Annual Message (Dec. 8, 1801), in 3 Writings of Jefferson at327 (cited in note 34).
74. Thomas Jefferson, Second Annual Message (Dec. 15, 1802), in 3 Writings of
Jefferson at 340 (cited in note 34). Jefferson concluded his second inaugural address by
asking Americans to join with him in prayer that the "Being in whose hands we are ...
will so enlighten the minds of your servants, guide their councils, and prosper their measures, that whatsoever they do, shall result in your good, and shall secure to you the peace,
friendship, and approbation of all nations." Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address, 4
March 1805, 3 Writings of Jefferson at 375, 383 (cited in note 34).
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on this issue buttresses a jurisdictional interpretation of the
"wall" erected in the Danbury letter.
In marked contrast to the separationist message of the
Danbury letter, Jefferson demonstrated a willingness to issue religious proclamations in colonial and state government settings.
For example, as a member of the House of Burgesses, on May
24, 1774, he participated in drafting and enacting a resolution
75
designating a "Day of Fasting, Humiliation, and Prayer." Jefferson recounted in his Autobiography:
We were under conviction of the necessity of arousing our
people from the lethargy into which they had fallen, as to
passing events [the Boston port bill); and thought that the appointment of a day of general fasting and prayer would be
most likely to call up and alarm their attention. . . . [W)e
cooked up a resolution ... for appointing the 1st day of June,
on which the porthill was to commence, for a day of fasting,
humiliation, and prayer, to implore Heaven to avert from us
the evils of civil war, to inspire us with firmness in support of
our rights, and to turn the hearts of the King and Parliament
76
to moderation and justice.

Jefferson thus seemed pleased with this accommodation between religion and the state.n In 1779, when Jefferson was governor of Virginia, he issued a proclamation decreeing a day "of
publick and solemn THANKSGIVING and prayer to Almighty
God." 78 (This proclamation was issued after Jefferson had
penned his famous "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.")
Also, in the late 1770s, as chair of the Virginia Committee of
Revisors, Jefferson was chief architect of a revised code that included a measure entitled "A Bill for Appointing Days of Public
Fasting and Thanksgiving." 79 This legislation apparently was
75. Resolution of the House of Burgesses Designating a Day of Fasting and Prayer
(May 24, 1774), in 1 Papers of Jefferson at 105 (cited in note 57).
76. Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, in 1 Writings of Jefferson at 1, 9-10 (cited in
note 34).
77. See Robert M. Healey, Jefferson on Religion in Public Education 135 (Archon
Books, 1970); Gaustad, Sworn on the Altar of God at 102-03 (cited in note 52) (commenting on Jefferson's role in this proclamation).
78. Proclamation Appointing a Day of Thanksgiving and Prayer (Nov. 11, 1779), in
3 Papers of Jefferson at 177-79 (cited in note 57).
79. Report of the Committee of Revisors Appointed by the General Assembly of Virginia in MDCCLXXVI at 59-60 (Dixon & Holt, 1784) ("Report of the Revisors"). The
bill is reprinted in 2 Papers of Jefferson at 556 (cited in note 57). This bill was part of a
legislative package that included Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom"
and "Bill for Punishing Disturbers of Religious Worship and Sabbath Breakers." The
three bills were apparently framed by Jefferson and sponsored in the Virginia legislature
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framed by Jefferson and introduced in the Virginia legislature by
James Madison on October 31, 1785.80 The bill authorized "the
Governor, or Chief Magistrate [of the Commonwealth], with the
advice of the Council," to designate days for thanksgiving and
fasting and to notify the public by proclamation. Far from simply granting the governor power to appoint "days of public fasting and humiliation, or thanksgiving," the bill included the following punitive provision: "Every minister of the gospel shall on
each day so to be appointed, attend and perform divine service
and preach a sermon, or discourse, suited to the occasion, in his
church, on pain of forfeiting fifty pounds for every failure, not
having a reasonable excuse. "81 Although the measure was never
enacted, it was sponsored by Madison, and a surviving manuscript copy of the bill bears a notation in the "clerk's hand" indicating that it was "endorsed" by Jefferson. 82 The final disposition of this legislation is unimportant to the present discussion.
The relevant consideration here is that Jefferson and Madison
jointly sponsored a bill that authorized Virginia's chief executive
to designate days in the public calendar for fasting and thanksgtvmg.
How is Jefferson's record on religious proclamations in Virginia reconciled with the position taken in the Danbury letter?
A careful review of Jefferson's actions throughout his public career suggests that he believed, as a matter of federalism, that the
national government had no jurisdiction in religious matters,
whereas state governments were authorized to accommodate
by James Madison. Sec Daniel L. Dreisbach, A New Perspective on Jefferson's Views on
Church-State Relations: The Virginia Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom in Its
Legislative Context, 35 Am. J. of Legal Hi st. 172 (1991 ).
80. Julian P. Boyd, editor of the Jefferson papers, did not explicitly attribute
authorship of this bill to Jefferson. He did not, however, reject the possibility that Jefferson drafted "A Bill for Appointing Days of Public Fasting and Thanksgiving." Boyd
noted that Jefferson apparently endorsed the bill. 2 Papers of Jefferson at 556 (cited in
note 57). Other scholars have described Jefferson as the author of this bill. Sec, e.g.,
Cord, Separation of Church and State at 220-21 (cited in note 68); Healey, Jefferson on
Religion in Public Education at 135 (cited in note 77); Donald L. Drakeman, Religion
and the Republic: James Madison and the First Amendment, 25 J. of Church & State 427,
441 (1983); Comment, 1978 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 657,666 (cited in note 66).
81. Report of the Revisors at 60 (cited in note 79); 2 Papers of Jefferson at 556 (cited
in note 57). The punitive feature of ··A Bill for Appointing Days of Public Fasting and
Thanksgiving" is difficult to reconcile with that portion of Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom" declaring "that no man shall be compelled to frequent or
support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever." Rep on of the Revisors at
58; 2 Papers of Jefferson at 546; William Waller Hening, ed., 12 The Statutes at Large;
Being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, From the First Session of the Legislature, in
the Year /619 at 86 (J. & G. Cochran, 1823).
82. 2 Papers of Jefferson at 556 (cited in note 57).
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83

and even prescribe religious exercises. Therefore, Jefferson
saw no inconsistency in sponsoring a religious proclamation as a
state official and refusing to issue a similar proclamation as U.S.
president. The "wall" metaphor was not offered as a general
pronouncement on the prudential relationship between religion
and all civil government; rather, it was, more specifically, a
statement delineating the legitimate constitutional jurisdictions
of the federal and state governments on matters pertaining to
religion. Jefferson's "wall," strictly speaking, was gloss on the
First Amendment, and it arguably had less to do with the separation between church and all civil government than with the separation between the federal and state governments.
Jefferson, one recalls, used the Danbury letter to explain
why he, as president, declined to issue religious proclamations.
Addressing the same issue in his letter to Samuel Miller, Jefferson specifically relied upon the Tenth Amendment principles of
federalism and strictly delegated powers. He took the position
that since no authority to appoint days for religious observance
was delegated to the federal government (including the nation's
chief executive), one must assume, pursuant to the Tenth
Amendment and the principle of limited federal powers, that
power in religious matters was "reserved to the States respec84
tively, or to the people." Jefferson, in short, acknowledged
state sovereignty, rather than federal supremacy, in matters of
religious liberty and establishment. He did not think that the
principle of federalism was inconsistent or at odds with the goals
of separationism inasmuch as both were concerned with checking the power of civil government, thereby protecting the rights
of conscience. The states, he believed, checked the abuse of
rights by the federal regime. 85 The separation of powers and
checks and balances, which were indispensable features of
American federalism, provided vital protections for liberty that
in Jefferson's view were arguably more important than a bill of
rights. While Jefferson, no doubt, desired each state through its
respective constitutions and laws to protect the natural rights of
citizens, it is unlikely that he thought the First Amendment with

83. See Rodney K. Smith, Public Prayer and the Constitution: A Case Study in Con·
stitutional Interpretation 98 n.71 (Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1987); Lietzau, 39 DePaul L.
Rev. at 1203-04 (cited in note 59).
84. U.S. Const., Amend. X.
. 85. See letter from Thomas Jefferson to Monsieur Destutt de Tracy (Jan. 26, 1811),
m 13 Writings of Jefferson at 13, 19 (cited in note 34) ("the true barriers of our liberty in
this country are our State governments").
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its "wall of separation" was the appropriate device to achieve
this goal. The use of a First Amendment wall to protect dissenters' religious rights in the states would have dangerously undermined that other great protector of civil and religious libertyfederalism.
Additional confirmation that the "wall of separation" was
erected between religion (i.e., the church) and the federal regime
is found in Jefferson's second inaugural address, delivered in
March 1805:86
In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exercise
is placed by the constitution independent of the powers of the
general [i.e., federal] government. I have therefore undertaken, on no occasion, to prescribe the religious exercises
suited to it; but have left them, as the constitution found
them, under the direction and discipline of State or Church
87
authorities acknowledged by the several religious societies.

The second inaugural address and letter to Samuel Miller addressed concerns identical to those raised in the Danbury letter.
One could argue that, in a sense, these subsequent statements
were Jefferson's own commentary on the "wall of separation."
Another constitutional question addressed in the Danbury
letter was whether the First Amendment restricted only the
Congress in matters respecting an establishment of religion, or
whether its prohibitions extended to the coequal branches of the
federal government (and, indeed, the entire federal government), thereby denying the executive branch the prerogative to
issue religious proclamations. 88 "I contemplate with sovereign
reverence," Jefferson wrote, "that act of the whole American
people [i.e., the people's ratification of the First Amendment]
which declared that their legislature [i.e., the federal Congress]
86. Edward S. Corwin described this portion of the second inaugural address, perhaps offered in response to criticisms of Jefferson's refusal to appoint days for national
religious observances, as a "more deliberate, more carefully considered evaluation by
Jefferson of the religious clauses of the First Amendment" than the Danbury letter.
Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board at 106 (cited in note 54).
87. Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1805), in 3 Writings of
Jefferson at 375, 378 (cited in note 34). Sec Anson Phelps Stokes, 1 Church and State in
the United States 335 (Harper & Brothers, 1950) (stating that in this passage of the address Jefferson "doubtless had in mind particularly his well-known objection to presidential Thanksgiving Day proclamations"); Gaustad, Sworn on the Altar of God at 99-100
(cited in note 52) (indicating that this passage of the address explicitly reaffirmed Jefferson's opposition to "presidential proclamations relating to religion").
88. Jefferson was concerned about the lack of presidential authority, under the federal Constitution, to appoint days for religious devotion. Comment, 1978 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
at 656 (cited in note 66).
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should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof [First Amendment religion
clauses],' thus building a wall of separation between Church &
State" (emphasis added). Since the powers of the executive are
derivative of the creative powers of the legislature, Jefferson
concluded that he, as president, could not assume power over
matters (such as religion) denied Congress. This separation of
powers argument was made forcefully in a sentence Jefferson included in the preliminary draft, but deleted from the final version, of the Danbury letter: "Congress thus inhibited from acts
respecting religion, and the Executive authorised only to execute
their acts, I have refrained from prescribing even occasional performances of devotion." 89 The text suggests, and Jefferson's actions as president confirm, that he concluded that the federal
chief executive was as restrained in making religious proclamations as he believed the Congress to be pursuant to the First
Amendment. This argument relating to the three branches of
the federal government coincided with the federalism argument.
The powers explicitly denied Congress were, in short, the powers
denied all branches and agencies of the federal government.
Therefore, the president, like Congress, must refrain from prescribing "performances of devotion."
Jefferson took seriously the jurisdictional prohibition on
federal involvement with religion, and in this respect he was
more separationist than many of his contemporaries. He went
further than most national public figures of his day in limiting
the federal government's acknowledgment of, or interaction
with, religion. (Many of Jefferson's contemporaries, by contrast,
did not believe thanksgiving proclamations by the national executive constituted a direct exercise of power over the subject of
religion, and thus they did not view the practice as a violation of
federalism or the nonestablishment provision. )90 By taking the
position that thanksgiving day proclamations by the federal chief
89. Draft letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge. Ephraim
Robbins, and Stephen S. Nelson, a committee of the Danbury Baptist association in the
state of Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (cited in note 47).
This sentence parallels an acknowledgment made in the letter from the Baptists: "we are
sensible that the President of the united States, is not the national Legislator, & also sensible that the national government cannot destroy the Laws of each State." Letter from a
committee of the Danbury Baptist association to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 7, 1801 ), in The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson (cited in note 7). Thus, language in both the Baptists' letter
and Jefferson's response confirm that it was generally understood and unchallenged, as a
principle of federalism, that religion was a subject of state jurisdiction.
90. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise
of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 Ariz. State L.J. 1085, 1096-97 (1995).
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executive offended the First Amendment, he adopted a more extreme view than the First Congress and his two presidential
predecessors. The strictures of the First and Tenth Amendments
notwithstanding, the First Congress, which framed the First
Amendment, called on President George Washington to designate "a day of public thanksgiving and prayer," 91 and appointed
legislative chaplains paid from the public treasury. 92 Both Presidents Washington and Adams designated days in the public cal93
endar for religious observance. By staking out a radical separationist position (in both the church-state and federalism senses)
at the federal level, Jefferson was sowing principles that, as he
implicitly conceded in his letter to Lincoln, were not ~et political
tenets widely and popularly accepted by the people. Again, it
should be emphasized that insofar as the separationist theme articulated in the Danbury letter was rooted in the First Amendment, Jefferson understood that it had application only at the
federal level.
A First Amendment "Wall"
The Danbury letter touched on a variety of issues worthy of
analysis, one of which was the principle of church-state separation. A comprehensive examination of Jefferson's church-state
views is beyond the scope of this article. The purpose and function of the "wall" he erected, however, are under review. The
"wall of separation" unquestionably was a figurative device used
to describe the First Amendment, which explicitly prohibited
Congress from making laws "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Prior to incorporation by way of the Fourteenth Amendment,95 the First
91. Joseph Gales, ed., 1 The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United
States 914 (Gales and Seaton, 1834), 1st Cong., 1st Scss. (Sept. 25, 1789); Linda Grant De
Pauw, ed., 1 Documentary History of the First Federal Congress of the United States of
America, March 4, 1789-March 3, 1791 at 197 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1972); Journal of
the First Session of the Senate of the United States of America 154 (Thomas Greenleaf,
1789) (discussing Sept. 26, 1789).
92. 1 U.S. Statutes at Large 23, 71 (1789).
93. For a discussion on the practices of Jefferson's two presidential predecessors in
appointing days for public thanksgiving and religious observance, see Stokes, 1 Church
and State in the United States at 486-91 (cited in note 87).
94. See Smith, Public Prayer and the Constitution at 62 (cited in note 83); Dreisbach, 39 J. of Church & State at 465-66 (cited in note 1).
95. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), and Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), the First Amendment free exercise and nonestablishment of religion provisions respectively were incorporated into the "liberties" protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment due process of law clause, thereby guarding these First
Amendment rights from infringement by the states. The present discussion is about Jef-
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Amendment imposed its restrictions only on Congress and, by
extension, Jefferson concluded, the entire federal regime. In
short, the "wall" Jefferson erected in the Danbury letter was between the federal government, on one side, and church authorities and state governments, on the other. Pursuant to the First
and Tenth Amendments and the purely executive nature of his
office, President Jefferson concluded that while state governments had the authority to act on matters pertaining to religion,
such power was denied the entire federal government, including
the national chief executive. Accordingly, Jefferson saw no contradiction in authoring a religious proclamation to be issued by
state authorities and refusing to issue a similar proclamation as
the federal chief executive.
Jefferson clearly disapproved of discrimination against the
Baptists in Connecticut. In his address, he looked forward to the
"progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all
his natural rights .... " It is unlikely, however, that Jefferson
thought the First Amendment "wall," which he described in the
Danbury letter, was the device to achieve the "progress of those
sentiments" at the state level.96 More important, the use of a
ferson's construction of his "wall" and not about post-Fourteenth Amendment interpretations of the metaphor. It should be noted that if the jurisdictional interpretation of the
First Amendment, and hence the "wall," is correct, then not only is it impossible (not to
mention illogical) to "incorporate" into the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment that which is essentially the structural assignment of authority over a specific subject matter to a particular level or branch of government (as opposed to a libertarian device that confers judicially enforceable, substantive rights upon individuals), but
also the First Amendment "cannot be incorporated without eviscerating its raison
d'etre." Note, 105 Harv. L. Rev. at 1709 (footnote omitted) (cited in note 54). Sec also
Smith, Foreordained Failure at 49-50 (cited in note 59); John F. Wilson, Religion, Political
Culture, and the Law, 41 DePaul L. Rev. 821, 835-36 (1992) ("at one level of irony, the
religion clauses ... have become appropriated to specific purposes directly opposed to
those that lead to their adoption."); Porth and George, 90 West Virginia L. Rev. at 13839 (cited in note 59); John E. Dunsford, Prayer in the Well: Some Heretical Reflections on
the Establishment Syndrome, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1984) ("It is a supreme irony of
history that the establishment clause was crafted by the framers for a purpose exactly
opposite from the one to which the Supreme Court has put it."); Conkle, 82 Nw. U. L.
Rev. at 1141 (cited in note 59); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 30910 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("As a matter of history, the First Amendment was
adopted solely as a limitation upon the newly created National Government. The events
leading to its adoption strongly suggest that the Establishment Clause was primarily an
attempt to insure that Congress not only would be powerless to establish a national
church, but would also be unable to interfere with existing state establishments .... Each
State was left free to go its own way and pursue its own policy with respect to religion ....
[I)t is not without irony that a constitutional provision evidently designed to leave the
States free to go their own way should now have become a restriction upon their autonomy."). Pursuant to this view, incorporating the nonestablishment provision (and Jefferson's "wall") is as nonsensical as incorporating the Tenth Amendment.
96. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins,
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"wall" erected by the First Amendment as an instrument for
church-state separation in the respective sovereign states would
have been contrary to the fundamental principle of federalism,
the unchallenged jurisdictional understanding of the federal Bill
of Rights, and Jefferson's commitment to a limited federal government and the sovereignty of the states. 97 It is plausible, even
likely, that Jefferson desired each state through its respective
constitutions and laws to erect its own wall of separation between ecclesiastical and state authorities, but these state walls
would not be the same First Amendment "wall" described in the
Danbury letter. There is every reason to believe that he would
have wanted the states to follow the model implemented in Virginia with passage in 1786 of his celebrated "Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom." In his 1808 letter to the Reverend
Miller, Jefferson once again ardently defended the rights of conscience with arguments applicable, it would seem, to both state
and federal magistrates;98 but, as in the Danbury letter, although
and Stephen S. Nelson, a committee of the Danbury Baptist association in the state of
Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802) in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (cited in note 1). In the
last sentence of the second paragraph of the Danbury letter, Jefferson wrote: "adhering
to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I
shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore
to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social
duties." "[T]his expression of the supreme will of the nation" is a reference to the First
Amendment, which was cited in the preceding two sentences of the preliminary draft
and, as previously noted, applied only to the federal government. In the second clause of
the sentence, it is not clear whether Jefferson was referring to a "progress of those sentiments" promoting the rights of conscience among individuals vis-a-vis the federal regime
only, pursuant to the First Amendment, or whether he was looking forward to the "progress of those sentiments" among citizens in the states because state governments voluntarily adopted the First Amendment model. He certainly did not believe the states were
subject to the First Amendment "wall."
97. McClellan made this same point, forcefully repudiating the Supreme Court's
"incorporation" of the First Amendment and, by extension, Jefferson's "wall" in recent
church-state jurisprudence: "To apply Jefferson's wall of separation theory to present
cases, as the Supreme Court has done, is to lift it wholly out of context. Jefferson believed that the states were free to prescribe the nature of religious liberty within their
respective jurisdictions.... The application of the Jeffersonian theory against the states,
and its utilization by the federal courts in deciding how a state should behave with respect to civil liberties, is wholly contrary to the very basis of the Jeffersonian philosophy
of states' rights; and it is incompatible with Jefferson's strong desire to resist the increasing powers of the Supreme Court. To say that the national courts instead of the various
state courts should possess final authority in the enforcement of an absolute wall of separation between church and state is similar to arguing that the powers of the states are
best preserved by transferring those powers to the federal government." McClellan, Joseph Story and the American Constitution at 143-44 (footnote omitted) (cited in note 57).
98. Jefferson was concerned that a civil magistrate's recommendation for a day of
public fasting and prayer would be, in effect, indistinguishable from a mandatory prescription for such exercises, and thereby would impose penalties on those who for reasons of conscience failed to comply. This argument applies equally to state and federal
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he specifically denied that the federal government had the
"power to prescribe any religious exercise," he acknowledged
that such power "rest[s] with the States, as far as it can be in any
human authority." Notwithstanding the useful purposes Jefferson thought were served by the First Amendment "wall," he understood that its strictures were not imposed on state governments or the voluntary religious societies.
Jefferson's "wall," like the First Amendment, affirmed the
policy of federalism. This policy emphasized that all governmental authority over religious matters was allocated to the states.
The metaphor's principal function was to delineate the legitimate jurisdictions of state and nation on religious issues, and it
was largely devoid of substantive content independent of its federalism.99 This controverts the conventional notion that Jefferson's metaphor encapsulated a general constitutional, prudential, and libertarian doctrine of church-state relationships and
religious liberty. Indeed, a jurisdictional understanding of the
"wall" raises serious questions regarding the way the metaphor
is typically used by courts and recommends an honest reappraisal of the propriety of its conventional use in discourse on
church and state. There is no evidence that Jefferson considered
the metaphor the quintessential symbolic expression of his
church-state views. There is little evidence to indicate that Jefferson thought the metaphor encapsulated a universal principle
of religious liberty or the prudential relationships between religion and all civil government (local, state, and federal). There
is much evidence, as set forth above, that the "wall" has been
used in ways-rhetorically and substantively-that its architect
almost certainly would not have recognized and, perhaps, would
have repudiated.
magistrates. Jefferson further argued that it is in the interests of religion to direct its own
exercises, discipline, and doctrines and not to vest such matters in the hands of civil government.
99. This language is borrowed from Steven D. Smith's commentary on the First
Amendment religion clauses. Smith, Foreordained Failure at 17 (cited in note 59). The
framers and ratifiers of the religion clauses, Smith argued, deliberately declined to adopt
a principle or theory of religious liberty. "They consciously chose not to answer the religion question, and they were able for the most part to avoid it ... because of the way in
which they answered the jurisdiction question-that is, by assigning the religion question
to the states." Accordingly, it is futile to locate in or extrapolate from the original
meaning of the religion clauses a substantive right or principle of religious liberty. In
other words, the First Amendment was calculated not to articulate a principle or theory
of religious liberty but merely to specify who (or what level of civil government) shall
substantively address this subject matter. ld. at 21, 25. See also Conkle, 82 Nw. U. L.
Rev. at 1133-35 (cited in note 59); Lietzau, 39 DePaul L. Rev. at 1199-1200 (cited in note
59).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The debate format of this article notwithstanding, the
authors found significant points of agreement, as well as disagreement. In their respective conclusions, each author briefly
critiques the other's position and summarizes his own interpretation of Jefferson's metaphor. In their final remarks, the authors
join in shared observations of the promises and problems of employing metaphors in politics and law.
Whaley's Conclusions
Without question, Dreisbach's analysis demonstrates that
Jefferson strongly supported the concept of federalism. This is
hardly surprising, since both federalism and religious liberty
were important principles for the Constitution's framers. However, a tension exists between the two concepts, and undoubtedly Jefferson was aware of it. Federalism allows states to govern autonomously, yet it is doubtful that Jefferson believed
states should govern with impunity. In this vein, Jefferson
clearly voiced his commitment to individual liberty in his response to the Danbury Baptists, writing that "religion is a matter
which lies solely between Man & his God." In this and other
writings Jefferson insisted that this right is inalienable, and
should not be infringed by any "legitimate powers of government," neither federal nor state.
Jefferson's commitment to this principle is embodied in the
"Statute of Virginia for Establishing Religious Freedom." And
in the wake of its adoption, Jefferson must have taken great
pride in witnessing other states following the Statute's model for
church disestablishment. Because this tide of religious liberty
grew out of state, rather than federal, government action, it is no
wonder that Jefferson greatly supported states' rights, since he
saw states as the firebrands of liberty. Given the recent British
example, wherein the awesome power of a large national government had led to a decrease in individual liberties, Jefferson
felt that states offered more hope for freedom of conscience than
the federal government. Even though some states still maintained traditional church-state ties during Jefferson's presidency,
the tide was clearly turning in favor of increased religious liberty.
This rising tide had not yet reached Connecticut, however,
and for groups like the Danbury Baptists there was little that
could be done to improve their marginal status. Federalism prevented intrusion by the federal government, even to guard rights
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listed in the Bill of Rights. Jefferson respected this and, as
Dreisbach points out, in his 1808 letter to the Reverend Samuel
Miller, Jefferson argued that the Constitution made it clear in
the First and Tenth Amendments that "certainly no power to
prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume authority in religious discipline, has been delegated to the general [i.e., federal]
government. It must then rest with the states, as far as it can be
in any human authority."
This last phrase is particularly instructive of Jefferson's
views and is indicative of the tension between states' rights and
individual liberties. Jefferson could have ended this paragraph
by merely acknowledging that authority over religion "must then
rest with the states." However, he emphasized the limitations of
state power, reminding Reverend Miller that state authority is
not absolute in this area. Here, Jefferson implicitly stated that in
matters of conscience, authority over religion lies primarily with
the individual or with the church. His insistence on this position
can be found further on in the same letter.
I do not believe it is for the interest of religion to invite the
civil magistrate to direct its exercises, its discipline, or its doctrines; nor of the religious societies, that the General [i.e.,
federal] Government should be invested with the power of effecting any uniformity of time or matter among them. Fasting
and prayer are religious exercises; the enjoining of them an
act of discipline. Every religious society has a right to determine for itself the times for these exercises, and the objects
proper for them, according to their own particular tenets; and
this right can never be safer than in their own hands, where
100
the Constitution has deposited it.

In the last phrase of this passage, Jefferson insisted that the Constitution deposited religious authority in the hands of religious
societies, whereas earlier in the same letter he had acknowledged state authority as well. An examination of the entire
Miller letter therefore shows how Jefferson could deftly blend
the concepts of both federalism and individual rights in matters
of religion.
A similar blending of state and individual religious authority
can be found in Jefferson's second inaugural address, to which
Dreisbach refers above:

100. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Reverend Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in
11 Writings of Jefferson at 428,429 (cited in note 34).
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In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exercise
is placed by the constitution independent of the powers of the
general [i.e., federal] government. I have therefore undertaken, on no occasion, to prescribe the religious exercises
suited to it; but have left them, as the constitution found
them, under the direction and discipline of State or Church
authorities acknowledged by the several religious societies.

Again, we see that two entities could have jurisdiction over religious matters, either "State or Church authorities." Clearly, as
in the case of the Danbury Baptists, this model could lead to
conflict. In Connecticut, the Baptist Church authorities and their
members desired increased liberty and autonomy, but they remained subservient to the state and its established Congregationalist church.
How is the apparent contradiction between Jefferson's behavior in Virginia and in the White House reconciled with a
separationist construction of the "wall of separation" metaphor?
Dreisbach argues that Jefferson's record in Virginia demonstrates that he believed that under federalism states were
authorized to advance religion even though it might infringe the
religious rights of some individual citizens. Dreisbach concludes
that the "wall" in Jefferson's Danbury letter merely separated
the federal government, which was proscribed from action regarding religion, from the states, which retained jurisdiction in
religious matters.
In contrast, I argue that Jefferson's actions in Virginia
merely reflect the historical context within which the guarantee
of individual liberties was a novel idea. At that time, the concept
of true religious liberty had barely been established, and it would
have been unrealistic to expect America at the turn of the eighteenth century to quickly and universally embrace it. Additionally, let us not forget that Jefferson was a career politician and,
101
as such, was not unknown to engage in largely political acts.
Jefferson's occasional willingness to employ religion on behalf of
the states' secular interests could be interpreted as a betrayal of
his principles. However, I would argue that these acts do little to
undermine his overall commitment to religious liberty, and may

101. For example, note Jeffen;on's willingness in Virginia to "cook up" a resolution
for fasting, thanksgiving and prayer to advance a political cause. See page 657 above.
See also Daniel L. Dreisbach, Real Threat and Mere Shadow: Religious Liberty and the
First Amendment 107-11 (Crossways Books, 1987).
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be interpreted as mere political maneuvering in an era when
church and state still maintained their traditionally close ties.
Given Jefferson's commitment to religious liberty, it seems
likely that the "wall" in the Danbury letter has more meaning
than a simple delineation of federal powers. Rather, Jefferson
most likely saw his "wall of separation between Church and
State" as the best way to maintain the integrity of religious belief, just as James Burgh had intended his "wall" in Crito. That
Jefferson would have used the Danbury response as a vehicle for
conveying this metaphor is not surprising. As Constance B.
Schulz noted, "[a]s President, he had used official responses to
citizen petitions as a means of publicly stating imrcortant principles" and "making his true political views known." 02
Jefferson's Virginia record may seem inconsistent with a
separationist interpretation of the "wall." However, an examination of the Danbury and Miller letters, as well as his second
inaugural address, provides the necessary insight to come to a
separationist conclusion. As I have argued above, Jefferson felt
strongly that true religious liberty was only possible when individuals could express their beliefs free from government intrusion of any type. His views on this are irrefutable. Still, Jefferson must have recognized that in his time this view was not
universally held. Various forms of religious establishment continued, and his contentious election in 1800 provided considerable evidence that complete religious freedom would be slow in
coming. Even in Virginia, where the "Statute for Establishing
Religious Freedom" was already on the books, political realities
occasionally made it necessary to enact legislation contrary to
the goals of true religious liberty.
It is within this context of fledgling religious liberty (and not
with twentieth-century hindsight) that one can explain the conflict between Jefferson's political actions and his "wall of separation." His commitment to the rights of conscience is not compromised by his statements in the Miller letter or second
inaugural address that both states and individuals (and their
churches) retained final jurisdiction over religion. Jefferson was
merely acknowledging the present reality: individuals in some
states enjoyed greater religious liberty than in others. In New
England, state authority over religion was still the norm, while in
other states authority over religion was slowly but surely being

102.

Schulz, 91 Virginia Magazine of History and Biography at 85 (cited in note 49).
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transferred to where, in Jefferson's mind, it belonged-a matter
"solely between Man & his God."
Jefferson rejoiced in this notion that the best way to preserve freedom of conscience was to prevent government collusion with religion. And while he recognized that acceptance of
the concept of church-state separation remained incomplete, he
saw in the First Amendment an important representation of this
goal. Even though the Constitution reserved to the states jurisdiction in this area, the First Amendment was a national symbol
of the principle that he held so dear. No wonder Jefferson "contemplate[ d) with solemn reverence that act of the whole American people." The Constitution had erected an enduring symbol
of religious liberty-a "wall of separation between Church and
State" that James Burgh would have admired. And while under
federalism the "wall" had its limitations, its mere presence made
a national statement for the importance of religious liberty. In
this vein Jefferson looked forward to the "progress" of religious
liberty embodied in the First Amendment as he concluded the
critical section of his famous Danbury letter.
Dreisbach's Conclusions
Whaley has succumbed to the temptation of reading latetwentieth-century values and sensibilities into early-nineteenthcentury text. His argument rests precariously on dubious inferences, unsubstantiated speculation, and wishful thinking. 103 He
discounts the explicit text of the Danbury letter, as well as Jefferson's unequivocal pronouncements that clearly confirm his
jurisdictional construction of the First Amendment. For example, Whaley's most compelling argument, in my judgment, is his
observation that Jefferson declined Levi Lincoln's proposed revision which emphasized the jurisdictional reason for not appointing days for religious observance. Whaley assumes that Jefferson eschewed Lincoln's recommendation because he wanted
the "wall" to articulate a universal principle of church-state
103. Whaley argues, it seems to me, that Jefferson's intent is found primarily, not in
the final draft of the Danbury letter which Jefferson sent, but in a preliminary draft
which he did nor send. When interpreting a document for the purpose of shaping public
policy, it strikes me as problematic to rely on a draft rather than the final version of that
document. A common sense rule of interpretation suggests that one rely primarily on
the letter sent-the letter that became a part of the public record. I agree that the draft
letter gives insight into Jefferson's thinking, but I am unwilling to rely on a draft letter
that Jefferson never sent to form the basis of constitutional interpretation or shape public
policy. Moreover, Whaley's wishful reading of the preliminary draft notwithstanding, I
find that the text of the draft buttresses the jurisdictional interpretation of the "wall."
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separation and not merely a jurisdictional principle. Although
this speculation is appealing to the modern, secular mind, it ignores other explanations for Jefferson's decision not to accept
Lincoln's proposal-such as a concern that the revised sentence
was becoming inartful, unwieldy, and confusing. Moreover,
Whaley is insufficiently attentive to Jefferson's Kentucky Resolutions (1798), second inaugural address (1805), and letter to the
Reverend Miller (1808) in which Jefferson explicitly embraced
104
the jurisdictional doctrine expressed in Lincoln's revision. The
second inaugural address and Miller letter are especially germane since historians report that they addressed concerns identical to those in the Danbury letter. In these documents Jefferson emphasized the jurisdictional principle over a universal
separationist principle. Whaley presumes to know what Jefferson meant or wanted to communicate, whether or not a plain
reading of the Danbury letter supports such a conclusion. Interestingly, in order to preserve Jefferson's strict separationist credentials, Whaley dismisses Jefferson's problematic public record
in Virginia pertaining to executive religious proclamations as the
actions of an unprincipled "career politician" who found "it necessary [i.e., politically expedient] to enact legislation contrary to
the goals of true religious liberty."
This debate is not about what Jefferson might have desired
or envisioned for the future, much less about what Whaley
would like a "wall of separation" to achieve. Rather, this debate
is about the meaning of the "wall of separation" Jefferson
erected in his 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist Association. It
is my contention that insofar as the "wall" was a metaphoric representation of the First Amendment, it had no application to
church-state relationships in the states. It is thus an acknowledgment of the fundamental constitutional principle of federalism, which was an essential feature of the national Bill of Rights.
Once again, the issue addressed in this article is the meaning
Jefferson attached to his "wall" metaphor. I readily concede
that Jefferson embraced a separation of the institutions of

104. When Whaley turns his attention to these documents in his conclusion, he concedes their jurisdictional import; but he adds, in an argument with which I agree, that
Jefferson believed religion was, first and foremost, a matter between an individual and
his God, and any institutional relationship between religion and the civil state should be
limited. In other words, Jefferson believed that matters of religion arc presumptively
and most appropriately left to the individual and church authorities, and the civil state
has only the most limited authority to interfere in religious matters. This is wholly consistent with the jurisdictional interpretation.
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church and state in his native Commonwealth. Moreover, he
supported a strict, but not absolute, separation principle at the
federal level that was more extreme than that endorsed by most
of his contemporaries. It does not follow from this, however,
that the "wall" erected in the Danbury letter articulated a universal separationist principle that governed church-state relationships at both the national and state levels. Indeed, the text
of the letter is clear; the "wall" was a metaphoric construction of
the First Amendment which, in Jefferson's day, was universally
understood to apply to the federal government only. Given their
respect for state sovereignty, "it cannot reasonably be inferred
from Madison's and Jefferson's opposition to establishment in
the state of Virginia that they supported a federally-imposed requirement of separation of church and state." 105
The conventional separationist construction of the "wall,"
which Whaley ably defends, is rich with irony. A metaphor that
affirmed the principle of federalism has been used to restrict
state policy pertaining to religion. Thus Jefferson's "wall" has
been appropriated for purposes diametrically opposite to those
for which it was constructed. In the second half of the twentieth
century, since the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Everson
v. Board of Education, 106 Jefferson's metaphor has been coopted
by separationist partisans for use in the bitter struggle to redefine church-state relations. (Indeed, I would argue that Whaley
defends not Jefferson's "wall" but the wall erected by Justice
Hugo L. Black and his judicial brethren in Everson.) Those who
have used the metaphor to shape church-state debate and policies in the states have turned Jefferson's metaphor on its head.
To apply Jefferson's "wall" to state policies achieves the opposite of that which it was designed to accomplish. The First
Amendment with its metaphoric "wall" originally prevented the
federal government from interfering with state authority over
religion.
One can speculate, as does Whaley, about Jefferson's ulterior motives or secret agenda in using the graphic "wall" metaphor. The text and surviving documentary record, however, are
absolutely clear that Jefferson's "wall" was a metaphoric representation of the First Amendment. The historical record also indicates that Jefferson understood that the First Amendment was

105.
106.

Note, 105 Harv. L. Rev. at 1705 (footnote omitted) (cited in note 54).
330 U.S. I (1947).
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adopted solely as a limitation upon the national government.
Thus the "wall" Jefferson erected in the Danbury letter was a
First Amendment wall applicable only at the federal level. The
text further reveals that Jefferson believed that his "wall," and
hence the First Amendment, separated the institutions of
"church" and "state," rather than separating "religion" from
public life. It is not self-evident-the conventional secular, separationist construction of the "wall" notwithstanding-that Jefferson thought his celebrated metaphor expressed a universal, prudential principle of church-state relations.
Final Thoughts
There is, perhaps, a danger in reading too much into Jefferson's simple, yet powerfully expressive, metaphor. The Danbury
letter was written more than a decade after the First Amendment was added to the Constitution, by a man who did not participate in either the Constitutional Convention or the First
Congress. The "wall" was neither Jefferson's first nor his last
word on the constitutional and prudential relationship between
church and state. There is no indication that he thought this figure of speech encapsulated the most salient aspects of his
church-state views or was his definitive word on the First
Amendment. All this invites the question whether or not it is
appropriate for courts and commentators to rely on the metaphor as a supplement to or substitute for constitutional language.
There is little doubt that Jefferson advocated a broad separation between civil and ecclesiastical institutions. Whether or
not he deliberately expressed this principle-applicable to all
relationships between religion and all agencies and levels of civil
government-in his celebrated metaphor is the subject of this
debate. Given Jefferson's distrust of the union of church and
state and his commitment to an expansive right of conscience for
all citizens, Whaley argues that there is every reason to believe
that Jefferson desired his "wall of separation" to promote the

107. Sec Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309-10 (1963) (Stewart,
1., dissenting) ("As a matter of history, the First Amendment was adopted solely as a
limitation upon the newly created National Government. The events leading to its adoption strongly suggest that the Establishment Oausc was primarily an attempt to insure
that Congress not only would be powerless to establish a national church, but would also
be unable to interfere with existing state establishments. . . . Each State was left free to
go its own way and pursue its own policy with respect to religion .... [I]t is not without
irony that a constitutional provision evidently designed to leave the States free to go their
own way should now have become a restriction upon their autonomy.").
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"progress of those sentiments" at all levels of civil governmentstate and nation. To abandon this interpretation of Jefferson's
"wall" would be to disregard the vision of this nation's most renowned champion of religious liberty, as well as to threaten
America's unparalleled combination of religious protection and
pluralism. If, on the other hand, Jefferson's "wall" is appropriately construed only in the context of constitutional federalism,
then Dreisbach suggests we must rethink the propriety of engrafting Jefferson's metaphor onto the Constitution-rhetorically or doctrinally-as an expression of a prudential and universal principle of church-state relations and religious liberty. The
jurisdictional interpretation of the metaphor posits that the
"wall" has been substantially misconstrued since Justice Hugo L.
Black rescued it from obscurity in Everson v. Board of Education. This debate has monumental implications for the legitimacy of past decisions, as well as for the future direction of law,
policy, and discourse on church and state in the United States.
Metaphors hold the promise of illuminating ambiguous and
complex ideas, of giving insight by way of analogy. They provide
new perspective, and often help to visualize or amplify difficult
concepts. There are also limitations to metaphors, especially in
the law. "It is one of the misfortunes of the law," Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes observed, "that ideas become encysted in
phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further
analysis. " 108 Figures of speech designed to simplify and clarify
thought end often by trivializing or enslaving it. Therefore, as
Justice Benjamin Cardozo counseled, "[m]etaphors in law are to
be narrowly watched." 109 Whether one believes Jefferson's
"wall" is substantive or jurisdictional, whether one believes it informs or distorts church-state debate, given its pervasive and
continuing influence on American church-state law and discourse, the metaphor's meaning merits frequent reference and
reexamination.

108. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347,391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
109. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58,61 (N.Y. 1926). Sec also Ronald F.
Thiemann, Religion in Public Life: A Dilemma for Democracy 42-43 (Georgetown U.
Press, 1996) ("Principles derived from metaphors have the advantage of capturing with
vividness and felicity the essential elements of a complicated situation. They have the
distinct disadvantage, however, of encouraging simplicity instead of precise analysis or
fostering caricature when detailed portraiture is needed.").

